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INTRODUCTION
The pervasiveness of violent crime must surely rank as one of the premier
failures of the twentieth century, as it rapidly approaches its inglorious
end.'
In a world that is becoming increasingly international, we must
admit that we are a world defined by war and seemingly unending
conflict. For residents of the United States this may require more ef-
fort or understanding, as war has not touched this country's shores in
many years.' Nevertheless, the United States has participated in
many wars, coups, dictatorships and military operations since the last
time its citizens heard the phrase, "Never again!"'
World War II, the war succeeding the war "to end all wars," does
not provide the solace and deterrence it promised to deliver. In a
very literal sense, "Never again," has not lived up to its promise. In-
stead, the phrase has become common parlance in the growing inter-
1. David 0. Friedrichs, Peacemaking Criminology and the Punitive Conun-
drum: A New Foundation for Social Control in the Twenty-First Centur'?, in
PUNISHMENT: SOCIAL CONTROL AND COERCION 27 (Christine T. Sistare ed., 1996).
2. Since the American Civil War between the Union Forces of the North and
the Confederate Army representing the South, only one other war touched United
States' soil. During World War II, Japanese forces bombed Pearl Harbor in Fla-
waii. The contiguous states, however, remain immune from the scars of war that
many modem countries still recall and, unfortunately, continue to endure.
3. Although the United States has not hosted a war, in the traditional sense, in
many years, the United States has certainly participated in several significant mili-
tary operations. See Lt. Col. Steven J. Lepper, War Crimes and the Protection of
Peacekeeping Forces, 28 AKRON L. REV. 411 (1995) (stating that "[s]ince the Cold
War ended we have had Desert Storm, Bosnia (still continues today), Somalia
(remnants of which are still around today) and Haiti .... This really is not peace.")
(internal parentheticals in original). Further examples include sending United
States forces into Grenada, Panama, and most recently, Iraq. In addition, United
States forces joined their NATO counterparts in lodging a containment attack
against Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic in the ongoing Balkan war.
4. See, e.g. John Shattuck, From Nuremberg to Dayton and Beyond: The
Struggle for Peace with Justice in Bosnia, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 27, 28
(1999) (observing that "Bosnia... confronted the world with a war that Europe
had thought it would [not] see again: a genocidal, ethnic-religious conflict, gener-
ating massive atrocities against civilians, creating millions of refugees and dis-
placed persons within a formerly unified nation.").
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national community.! Shortly after the Dirty War in Argentina, a
truth commission issued findings entitled "Nunca Mas."' Likewise,
Brazil concluded its dictatorship with a new Constitution and a report
documenting atrocities dubbed "Nunca Mais." Finally, Uruguay la-
beled its groundbreaking report following its military dictatorship as,
"Nunca Mas."' With resounding consistency, people around the
world continue to hear the assurance, "Never again!"
5. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE xill (1997) (recalling that
"[a]fter the Nazis exterminated six million Jews during the Holocaust, the world
community said 'Never again."'); see also Diane F. Orentlicher, International
Criminal Law and the Cambodian Killing Fields, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 705,
706 (1997) [hereinafter Orentlicher, International Criminal Law] (stating that "[ilf
a state provides sanctuary to Nazis, it has breached the vow of universal con-
science, 'Never Again."'); Kofi Annan, Advocating Ibr an International Criminal
Court, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 363, 364-65 (1997) (advocating for the establish-
ment of an international criminal court to give true meaning to the phrase, "'Never
again").
6. Nunca mas is the Spanish translation of the phrase "'Never again." .Vunca
Mas was the report prepared by the Argentine National Commission on the Disap-
peared. See Neil J. Kritz, Editor's Introduction, in 2 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 323 (Neil J. Kntz ed.,
1995) (pointing out that the National Commission was appointed by Argentinean
President Raul Alfonsin). The National Commission's report "was widely read in
Argentina and abroad and provided powerful documentation of the systematic
violation of human rights by the military regime." Id. at 324.
7. Nunca mais is the Portuguese translation of "Never again." Much like the
Argentinean project, the Brazilian research project, Brasil: Nunca Mais, resulted
from a presidential directive. See Joan Dassin, Torture in Brazil: A Report by the
Archdiocese of Sao Paulo, in 2 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMIERGING
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 448, 451 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995)
(stating that the objective of the research project "Brazil: Never Again," was to
give a true meaning to the phrase "Never again" thus attempting to ensure that the
violence, infamy, injustice, and persecution that occurred in Brazil in the past
would not be repeated).
8. Unlike the Argentinean report prepared by the government commission and
the Brazilian report prepared largely with church assistance, the Uruguayan report
had neither government nor church support. Rather, the project ultimately was
taken up by the Peace and Justice Service ("SERPAJ"). See Sevico Paz y Justicia,
Uruguay Nunca Mas: Human Rights Violations 1972-1985, in 2 TILNSITIONAL
JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITii FORMER REGIMES 420
(Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995). (reasoning by SERPAJ for undertaking the project, which
was the threat against silencing the collective memory). "IThe need for docu-
menting [is] in order to inform, to make sure that what had happened would not be
forgotten or, considering the awfulness of the experience, its lessons lost." /d. at
428.
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This simple phrase emanates a belief in peace and a desire for
distance from the harsh realities of war. "Never again," was a pri-
mary catalyst behind the formation of the United Nations ("UN") in
1945.! Yet, what role has the UN successfully played in curtailing the
onset of and the causalities caused by war? Despite accurate and reli-
able information regarding the situation in Rwanda, the UN and its
Member States stood idly by and thus enabled the mass execution of
between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Rwandans in only 100 days.'0 One
witness testifying before the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR" or "Arusha") projected that if the UN had sent a
mere 50,000 troops to Rwanda, the mass-genocide could have been
averted successfully." Likewise, the UN has been equally ineffective
in the ongoing conflict in Angola.'2 Despite warnings to the UN from
9. The term "United Nations" was coined by President Franklin Delano Roos-
evelt of the United States when twenty-six nations pledged their support against
the Axis powers in a document entitled "Declaration by United Nations." See
United Nations, Basic Facts About the United Nations (visited Aug. 23, 1999)
<http://www.un.org>; see also GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 67
(1994) (stating that "[t]he establishment of the United Nations Organization in
1945 was the central act of recognition by the war-surviving generation that
something striking had to be done to avoid the recurrence of such disasters.").
10. See Bernard Muna, Conference on War Crimes Tribunals: The Rwanda
Tribunal and its Relationship to National Trials in Rwanda, 13 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1469, 1480 (1998) (commenting on the expediency of the mass-executions in
Rwanda).
[T]he genocide in Rwanda was five times faster than the one in Germany,
even though the German genocide had gas chambers. If you take the lower
figure of 500,000 people killed you are looking at 5,000 people a day. If you
take the higher figure of one million people killed, you are looking at 10,000
people killed a day without guillotines or gas chambers. Instead, most of the
killings were done with match heads and spears. This meant that a large pro-
portion of the population were implicated for this to succeed.
Id.
11. See The Honorable Navanethem Pillay, Conference on War Crimes Tribu-
nals: The Rwanda Tribunal and its Relationship to National Trials in Rwanda, 13
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1469, 1479 (1998) (stating that Major-General Romeo Dal-
laire offered this projection while testifying before the ICTR in its first trial).
12. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ANGOLA: ARMS TRADE AND
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR SINCE THE 1992 ELECTIONS (1994) [hereinafter
ANGOLA] (depicting the conflict raging in Angola in a report by "Human Rights
Watch Africa" and "Human Rights Watch Arms Project"). The report cites both
the Savimbi-led UNITA forces and the government-maintained MPLA forces with
violations of Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions. See id. at 134-52.
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the warring factions that peacekeepers were unwelcome, the UN in-
vested millions of dollars to send peacekeeping forces into Angola
that were withdrawn well before the end of the conflict."
And finally, we must recognize the limited influence the UN has
wielded over the territories of the Former Yugoslavia." Even the six-
year presence of an ad hoc International Tribunal in the Netherlands
and its added threat of punishment has not adequately deterred the
warring factions from committing rape, torture, forced expulsion,
forced displacement, genocide, murder and other war crimes." While
the UN considered sending peacekeeping forces back into the For-
mer Yugoslavia, NATO forces lodged a separate air-attack against
The report states that "UNITA has been guilty of horrendous violations of the laws
of war, including direct attacks on civilians, indiscriminate shelling, summary exe-
cutions, mutilation of corpses, starvation of civilians, hostage-taking, forced
portering, recruitment of child soldiers, denial of the freedom of movement, and
blockage of relief aid." Id. at 88. Likewise, government forces were charged with
"widespread violations of the rules of war since the October 1992 elections, in-
cluding direct attacks on civilians, indiscriminate attacks, summary executions,
torture, forced displacement, and recruitment." Id. at 61.
13. See id. (reporting that, during the transitional period alone, the UN main-
tained 576 officials within Angola at a cost ofS 132 million).
14. See The Honorable Gilbert Guillaume, The Future of International Judicial
Institutions, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 848, 857 (1995) (discussing the very early
workings of the Tribunal).
Many people, both in the United Nations and in academic circles, noted first
that the decision to establish the Tribunal was made by the Security Council
in February 1993 at a time when there was a "'total lack of progress towards
peace in the region." As the Tribunal itself put in its first report, the Security
Council then had a "need to demonstrate to the international community that
the UN was not sitting back idly .... But the maintenance of peace in the re-
gion is above all the responsibility of the Security Council, whose action has
not been particularly successful in this respect over the past three years. Ne-
gotiations are still going on in that connection and include such persons as
Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Mladic, who were named by the Prosecutor of the Tri-
bunal as "war criminal suspects." At a certain stage, it could prove impossible
to maintain this dual approach and one might be faced with a difficult choice.
Id.
15. See War With Milosevic, ECONOMIST, Apr. 3, 1999, at 17-18 (indicating
that as many as one million refugees in Kosovo may have been displaced during
the Serbian-led ethnic cleansing efforts of March and April, 1999). At one point,
the refugees were pouring over the borders of neighboring Albania, Macedonia,
and Montenegro at a rate of approximately 4,000 per hour. See i.
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Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic after growing impatient with
the seeming impunity enjoyed by combatants of the Balkan conflict."
The title of this work embodies a concern that if the International
Criminal Tribunals at Nuremberg, Tokyo and the recent additions at
The Hague' 7 and Arusha are used as a gauge for deterring future
violence, the international community must admit failure.'" This
statement, however, is somewhat shortsighted in that it analyzes only
one mechanism for achieving peace. The Nuremberg and Tokyo
precedent provided the fertile ground for adopting two modern ad
hoc International Tribunals and, potentially, an international criminal
court capable of providing international redress for crimes. These
advancements in a unified world community were not possible
shortly after the Second World War. Rather, the advancements that
stem from Nuremberg and Tokyo are a direct result of their failures.
Ours is a world unquestionably divided by conflict.'9 War and
chaos linger in the Congo.20 Starvation and disease are prevalent in
16. See id. (pointing out that NATO began the air strikes against the Former
Yugoslavia). It is important to recognize that the NATO air strikes were not pre-
approved or sanctioned by the UN See United Nations, Security Council Rejecting
Demand for Cessation of Force Against Yugoslavia (visited Aug. 23, 1999)
<http://www.un.org/news/press> (underscoring the factious nature of the NATO
campaign in a Press Release issued on Mar. 26, 1999). Russia, one of five perma-
nent members of the UN Security Council, sponsored a resolution demanding that
NATO cease its unilateral use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
See id. (noting further that China, another permanent member of the Security
Council, joined Russia in supporting the Resolution). The measure failed by a
count of 12 votes to 3. See id.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 26-27 (setting forth that "The Hague" is
used interchangeably with the "ICTY," which is the Tribunal prosecuting war
criminals from the Former Yugoslavia).
18. During the time this Article was written, war and killings continued in both
Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. The issuance of six final judgments against
ICTY defendants did not curtail the ethnic cleansing or forced displacements that
occurred throughout Kosovo and other Balkan regions. See War With Milosevic,
supra note 15.
19. See Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecution versus Dusko Tadic: An Appraisal
of the First International War Crimes Trial since Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. RLV.
861, 861-62 (1997) (detailing the numerous atrocities that plagued the world since
the claim, "Never again," including Cambodia, Argentina, East Timor, Uganda,
Iraq, and El Salvador).
20. See ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 145 (1998) (discussing the unrest that prevails in
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war-torn Iraq."' Conflict remains in Rwanda! Violence continues in
Sierra Leone, Indonesia," Afghanistan, Angola, East Timor, Cambo-
dia,24 and numerous other countries.25 We must assess the impact of
modem efforts to combat war lest we fail again.e With the tools the
international community now possesses, there is an opportunity for
redemption. Enforcement of international humanitarian law and hu-
Congo).
21. See id. (referring to the poor conditions that remain in Iraq that are the re-
sult of war).
22. See Todd Howland & William Calathes, The L'Ns International Criminal
Tribunal, Is It Justice or Jingoism for Rwanda: A Call fbr Translbrnation, 39 VA.
J. INT'L L. 135, 151 n.60 (1998) (citing the United States Department of State 1997
Country Report for Rwanda).
23. See generally Seth Mydans, Ancient Hatreds. New Battles, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1999, at 50 (Magazine) (describing the war between Christians and Mus-
lims that has resulted in tens of thousands of people, mostly Muslim immigrants,
fleeing).
24. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CAMBODIA AT WAR (1995) [hereinafter
CAMBODIA] (describing the war crimes that continue to be committed in the on-
going conflict in Cambodia). Much like the prior report prepared by Human Rights
Watch regarding Angola, this report similarly documents abuses committed by
both Royal Governmental forces and the Khmer Rogue. See id. at 22 (remember-
ing the Khmer Rogue for "their bloody reign from 1975 to 1979, when approxi-
mately a million Cambodians-almost one eighth of the population-lost their
lives outright to murder, starvation, slave labor and disease."). Ironically, Human
Rights Watch begins its report by proclaiming that "[a]lthough the United Nations
peacekeeping mission in Cambodia has been hailed as one of the most successful
ever, Cambodia was back at war even before the last of the peacekeepers had left."
Id. at 10.
25. NEIER, supra note 20, at 415 (noting that more than one hundred conflicts
worldwide existed, and continue to exist, since the end of World War II and illus-
trating this point by stating that, at the time the book was written, such conflicts
existed in Afghanistan, India, Burma, Indonesia, Turkey, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Colum-
bia, Peru, Congo, Uganda, Liberia, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Sudan).
26. See JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL 442 (1994) (ad-
vocating a need to establish an international instrumentality to punish the perpe-
trators of over one hundred wars who have collectively killed millions of people).
Between 1945 and 1992, the world experienced twenty-four wars between
nations, costing 6,623,000 civilian and military lives. Ninety-three civil wars,
wars of independence, and insurgencies have cost 15,513,000 additional lives.
Until 1993, no international instrument had been convened to try any aggres-
sor or any perpetrator of war crimes in any of these 117 conflicts.
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man rights obligations, however, remains the cornerstone of any
formula for success.
Accordingly, this Article addresses the importance of enforcement
issues as they relate to international criminal law. Part I of this Arti-
cle considers the history and development of the International Tribu-
nals. Specifically, Part I first addresses the history and legacy of
Leipzig and the renowned Nuremberg Tribunal and their respective
contributions to the development of the two current ad hoc Tribunals
in The Hague and Arusha. Part II analyzes the difficulty of enforcing
international criminal law, particularly as it relates to arrests and tri-
als conducted at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY" or "The Hague") and the ICTR. Parts III
through V of this Article address the numerous issues related to
punishment in international criminal law and contemplates whether
such punishment, in fact, operates to further the protection of human
rights. Finally, the Article concludes with recommendations that ad-
dress the future role that international criminal tribunals should as-
sume if such bodies are to be utilized successfully in combating hu-
man rights violations and atrocities of war.
At a time when the world community is coming increasingly
closer together,27 there is a duty to future generations to leave a leg-
acy of peace. The tools are readily available. Malleable blueprints
exist from our unfortunate predecessors, yet the responsibility lies
with this generation to improve upon these prior judicial offerings.
We must begin forging a collective solution to combat international
violence before it is too late. The starting place may be as simple as
enforcing the laws that we, as an international community, have al-
ready agreed exist. This Article considers whether the use of interna-
tional criminal tribunals is the best mechanism to achieve the result
we are seeking. This analysis is necessary, lest we fail.
27. See FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 1996); see also THOMAS BUERGENTIIAL
& DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS (4th ed. 1995)
(providing an example of the increasing cohesiveness between sovereign nations
by the development, and successful maintenance, of regional judicial systems such
as those that currently exist in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, each having the
common goal of securing and preserving human rights in areas that were previ-
ously dominated by violence).
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I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
The point is often made.... that the war crimes prosecutions in the for-
mer Yugoslavia and in Rwanda cannot possibly be as effective as the
Nuremberg trials because there cannot be any victors' justice. I think the
contrast between the Nuremberg trials and the Bosnia, Yugoslavia and
Rwanda trials is even greater than that. I would go so far as to say
whereas the Nuremberg trials were a symbol of the allies' triumph, the
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in many ways symbol-
ize failure.2
As the world community stood mute and watched the horrors un-
folding in Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, it is plain to see that
the world as an international community failed by not intervening
when intervention was clearly possible. We failed to step in when the
chance existed to legitimize the cry, "Never again!" Now, as the
world gazes upon the rubble and destruction that permeates what re-
mains in both Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, we must re-
evaluate our ability to deter international violence. It is time that the
world community honestly addresses the difficulties encountered in
securing peace among varied cultures. In doing so, world leaders
must reassess the impact that criminal prosecutions and international
tribunals have in securing and furthering human rights.
A. THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG
When we evaluate the impact of World War 11 war crimes trials on re-
ducing future atrocities, we must admit failure. °
28. Tom Gjelten, Conference on War Crimes Tribunals: Tribunal Justice. the
Challenges, the Record, and the Prospects, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1541, 1556
(1998).
29. After maintaining the Yugoslav Tribunal for nearly six years, NATO forces
apparently took "the law" into their own hands by contravening the wishes of other
members of the UN Security Council. This action, regardless of any military ad-
vances that may have destabilized the Serbian forces, unquestionably resulted in an
exodus of Albanian refugees. See John Kifier, Kosovars Flee to Beat Serb Dead-
line of Death, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 31, 1999, at Al (reporting on the mass-exodus of
refugees fleeing Kosovo).
30. JOHNL. GINN, SUGAMO PRISON, TOKYO 241, at 56(1992).
29
AM. U. INT'L L. RE v.
One cannot legitimately begin to discuss the two modem war
crimes tribunals without first pausing to consider the legacy of the
International Military Tribunal ("Nuremberg") at Nuremberg.3" This
analysis is necessary because Nuremberg truly "marked the re-
affirmation of the importance of the individual in the world of na-
tion-states." Nuremberg initiated a process whereby individuals, as
opposed to nation-states, were subject to criminal prosecution for the
atrocities of war and violations of the laws of war." This revolution
in international law, however, was not accomplished without great
34criticism. 3
31. See, e.g., PERSICO, supra note 26, at ix (writing about Nuremberg after
nearly half a century because of the stark similarity between Serbian concentration
camps and the atrocities seen in Auschwitz and Buchenwald); SCHARF, supra note
5, at 3-17 (paralleling German concentration camps to the atrocities experienced in
the Former Yugoslavia); Michael P. Scharf, Trial and Error: An Assessment of the
First Judgment of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L & POL.
167, 167 (1998) (referencing Nuremberg in the first sentence of the article). While
the Perisco book acknowledges the importance of the Tokyo Tribunal, both in
terms of history and precedent, the scope of this article does not permit a detailed
discussion of the Tokyo Tribunal. See generally GINN, supra note 30; RICHARD L.
LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT 59-77 (1982); LAWRENCE TAYLOR, A TRIAL
OF GENERALS 103-11 (1981); M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in
Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal
Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 31-38 (1997) (describing in detail, the Tokyo
Tribunal and prosecutions of Japanese war criminals under General Douglas A.
MacArthur).
32. Henry T. King, Jr., Address: The Meaning of Nuremberg, 30 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 143, 148 (1998).
33. See id. at 147 (asserting that Nuremberg's most important contribution was
the prosecution of individuals, instead of merely nations, for violations of world
peace and human rights); see also NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, IMPUNITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 24 (1995) (contending that Nur-
emberg was revolutionary in its prosecutions of people instead of nation-states for
human rights atrocities).
34. See, e.g., Senator Howard Taft, in WILLIAM SAFIRE, LEND ME YOUR EARS:
GREAT SPEECHES IN HISTORY 597, 601 (1992) (illustrating one of the strongest and
most memorable criticisms in opposition of the World War II war crimes Tribunals
because they represented an ex postfacto application of law).
I believe that most Americans view with discomfort the war trials which have
just been concluded in Germany and are proceeding in Japan. They violate
that fundamental principle of American law that a man cannot be tried under
an ex post facto statute. The trial of the vanquished by the victors cannot be
impartial, no matter how it is hedged about with the forms of justice. I ques-
330 [15:32 1
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Nuremberg was a reactionary body. It was created in reaction to
the unspeakable atrocities committed in Europe during World War II
against gypsies, Catholics, homosexuals, mentally and physically
impaired persons, and Jews. Nuremberg was necessary to demon-
strate that if a Third World War occurred, justice in the form of
prosecutions and criminal sentences would be swiftly and sternly
administered. In this regard, Nuremberg was additionally a reaction
to the failures experienced at Leipzig. '5
Immediately following the First World War ("World War I"), the
victorious Allies gathered together to determine the fate of those
most responsible for the war.36 The main target was to be the German
Kaiser, Wilhelm ]i.37 After convening a "Commission on the Re-
sponsibility of the Authors of the War and On Enforcement Penal-
ties,"38 the Allies submitted a list of 896 suspected war criminals to
Germany.39 Germany adamantly refused the list and informed the
tion whether the hanging of those who, however despicable, were the leaders
of the German people will ever discourage the making of aggressive war, for
no one makes aggressive war unless he expects to win. About this whole
judgment there is the spirit of vengeance, and vengeance is seldom justice.
The hangings of the eleven men convicted will be a blot on the American rec-
ord which we shall long regret.
Id.
35. See KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECLtiON
IN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 96 (1997) (characterizing the estab-
lishment of a Tribunal at Nuremberg as reactionary).
36. See Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 14-15 (indicating that three Articles ap-
pearing in the Treaty of Versailles address the need for an ad hoc criminal tribu-
nal). Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles specifically "recognizes the right of the
Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of
having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war." Id. at 15 n.8.
The two major Articles addressing criminal proceedings, Articles 227 and 228,
never were implemented. See id. at 18.
37. See TELEFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 12
(1992) (comparing Kaiser Wilhelm II to Hitler by observing that "Kaiser Wilhelm
II and his general staff contrived to conduct German war operations in such a way
as to raise a worldwide storm of hate and fear, almost comparable to that achieved
by Adolph Hitler a quarter of a century later.").
38. See DONALD A. WELLS, WAR CRIMES AND LAWS OF WAR 69 (1984) (ex-
plaining that the Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of War and On En-
forcement Penalties' function was the investigation of war crimes and the recom-
mendation of appropriate action for those crimes).
39. The actual number of persons named in this initial document is the subject
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Allies that such prosecutions, if attempted, would result in the re-
newed outbreak of war.40 Rather than force the prosecution issue, the
Allies reevaluated the suspects and sent Germany a second, much
shorter list identifying forty-five alleged war criminals. 4' Again,
Germany resisted the idea of what it considered to be broad prosecu-
tions and eventually agreed to prosecute twelve of the individuals
named before the Supreme Court of Germany at Leipzig. 2 These
prosecutions resulted in a mere six convictions with initial sentences
ranging from six-months to four-years imprisonment.4' This dismal
of some controversy. See TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 17 (stating that "on February
3, 1920, the Allies presented to the Germans a list of 854 individuals, including
many famous military and political figures, for turnover"). Compare WELLS, supra
note 38, at 70 (recounting that "[o]n February 3, 1920 a list of 896 alleged war
criminals was submitted to Baron von Lersner, the German Legate."), with NEIER,
supra note 20, at 254 (proffering that 895 suspected war criminals were listed for
prosecution), and Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 16 n.12 (acknowledging that a
fourth view reports a list containing 901 names but contends 895 names is the ap-
propriate number). The author relied upon the 896 figure because it appears most
frequently in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., Major Marsha V. Mills, War Crimes
in the 21st Century, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 47, 59 (1999) (stating that the
refusal of Germany to hand over the 896 requested defendants was based on the
rationale that if Germany acquiesced, the delicate peace that was reached would
break); Timothy L.H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crintes
and the Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 705
n. 129 (1997) (providing the following break-down of the defendants demanded by
the Allied Forces: United Kingdom (97), Belgium (334), France (334), Italy (29),
Poland (57), and Romania (41)); Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., International Obligations
to Search for and Arrest War Criminals: Government Failure in the Formner Yugo-
slavia?, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 411,417 (1997).
40. See WELLS, supra note 38, at 70 (discussing Germany's refusal to bring
forth the 896 war criminals who the Allies requested for prosecution).
41. Unlike the figures contained in the initial submission by the Allies, there
was no disagreement on the amended submission. See TAYLOR, supra note 37, at
17; WELLS, supra note 38, at 70; Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 20; McCormack, su'-
pra note 39, at 706; Sharp, supra note 39, at 417-18 (indicating that 45 alleged war
criminals were on the final list sent to Germany by the Allies).
42. See WELLS, supra note 38, at 70 (proffering that Germany ultimately
agreed to the prosecution of twelve war criminals).
43. See TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 17; WELLS, supra note 38, at 70 (reporting
that three of the men convicted received sentences of six months, ten months, and
two years, respectively). These light sentences served as a strong impetus for the
creation of the International Military Tribunal ("Nuremberg") at Nuremberg many
years later. See McCormack, supra note 39, at 706 (asserting that the Allies con-
sidered each of the defendants' sentences to be lenient); Mills, supra note 39, at 59
(commenting on the lenient sentences handed down to the six defendants); Sharp,
[15:321332
2000] ENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 333
record of prosecutions and the lack of any semblance of justice re-
sulted in the withdrawal of Allied Observers at Leipzig.4 A few mi-
nor prosecutions of World War I war criminals continued in Bel-
gium, France, Bulgaria, and Turkey. 5
Overall, however, Leipzig was a failure.' Leipzig convincingly
demonstrated that the international community could not trust the
domestic courts of defeated nations to render impartial justice." This
phenomenon has repeated itself in numerous settings since the failure
of Leipzig.4 In fact, Hitler himself relied upon the Allies' inertia
following World War I in proclaiming, "[w]ho after all is today
speaking about the destruction of the Armenians? ''4v Yet, Hitler's be-
lief that the acts of the Third Reich would remain above reproach
underestimated the residual effect of Leipzig. The victorious Allies
were determined to avoid their past mistakes. This determination
materialized in tangible form at Nuremberg.
supra note 39, at 418 (stating that the six defendants who were convicted each re-
ceived light sentences).
44. See WELLS, supra note 38, at 70 (discussing the destructive result of the
miniscule number of convictions and the lenient sentences given at Leipzig).
45. See id.; see also TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 18 (observing, ironically, that
only Yugoslavia, among the Balkan states, called for the punishment of war crimi-
nals).
46. See Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 20 (asserting that true justice was sacri-
ficed in Leipzig for international and domestic politics of the Allied countries be-
cause the Treaty's commitment to try and punish perpetrators of war crimes was
never carried out).
47. See BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, 2 ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW-A WAY
TO WORLD PEACE 439 (1983).
48. See TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 18 (maintaining that, since the Treaty of
Lausanne in 1923, the political price for cessation of hostilities is the award of am-
nesty for defeated forces); see also Aryeh Neier, What Should be Done About the
Guilty?, 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIEs RECKON WITH
FORMER REGIMES 172, 177-78 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (describing the amnesties
adopted in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Chile in the 1980s);
Jos6 Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed b.) Former Gov-
ernments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in I TRA NSITIONAL
JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 3 (Neil
J. Kritz ed., 1995) (distinguishing between the Argentinean case that resulted in
some prosecutions and the Uruguayan case involving amnesties).
49. See Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 21 (quoting Adolph Hitler in his speech to
the Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals on the Obersalzburg on Aug.
22, 1939).
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Nuremberg is often hailed as "victors' justice" and challenged for
its application of ex post facto laws.5" In retrospect, these objections
are not wholly without merit.5 The precepts established by the Nur-
emberg and Tokyo Tribunals advanced radical theories regarding the
conduct of war. Never again would soldiers be immune from prose-
cution after committing grave and unspeakable tragedies against hu-
mankind-even in the name of war. Following Nuremberg, soldiers
may finally be held accountable for actions which-though prohib-
ited for years in numerous international and domestic treaties-had
gone unpunished by law for centuries. The challenged innovation at
Nuremberg and Tokyo was not the novelty of the law or the crimes
listed in the indictments. Rather, the shocking advancement was that
the existing laws were finally being enforced in an international set-
ting. 2 The passionate cry of "Never again" was transmogrified into a
merciful plea of "Never before!"
In many regards, Nuremberg is a dark shadow ominously clouding
50. See I VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 332
(1994) ("A primary criticism of Nuremberg was that it amounted to victors' justice
since the tribunal was composed exclusively of prosecutors and judges from the
victorious countries and the defendants were limited to Germans, even though the
allied personnel also committed serious violations of humanitarian law during the
war"). By contrast, the International Tribunal was not created by either the victors
or the parties involved in the conflict, but rather, it was created by the UN, which
represented the international community. See id. (contrasting the establishment of
the Nuremberg Tribunal with later international tribunals); see also Bassiouni, su-
pra note 31, at 29 (averring that, in Nuremberg, all of the defendants were German
whereas none of the Allied Military was prosecuted for war crimes against Ger-
mans thus resulting in a one-sided prosecution).
51. See SCHARF, supra note 5, at 11 (criticizing the Allies for not appointing
either a German, or neutral, judge to the Tribunal since many of the victor states'
own citizens were equally guilty of war crimes perpetrated against Germans).
52. See id. at 13 (maintaining that Nuremberg should not be judged by contem-
porary standards, rather viewed in light of its historical context thus appreciating
the extraordinary fact that the major German war criminals were even given a trial
instead of being summarily executed as proposed by Churchill and Stalin); see also
Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2555 (1991) [hereinafter Or-
entlicher, Settling Accounts] (claiming that the Nuremberg prosecutions, by prose-
cuting German nationals, vastly broadened the scope of international law because
prior to that time, international law never addressed a state's treatment of its own
citizens, much less imposed criminal sanctions for such conduct).
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the history of international criminal law. Nuremberg still stands as a
testament to the fact that the laws of war are meted out by the victors
of war. Hence, modem scholars of international law attempt to ig-
nore and minimize the concerns regarding "victors' justice" and the
application of ex post facto laws." Instead, many commentators tb-
cus on the important moral imperative of bringing the architects and
perpetrators of international atrocities to justice. While Nuremberg
may be vulnerable to challenge on procedural grounds, there is no
denying the legacy that this Tribunal left in the development of in-
ternational criminal law." For all its shortcomings, Nuremberg was a
necessary, albeit imperfect, judicial process.!' Nuremberg laid the
foundation for the next major milestone in international criminal law,
the ICTY 7
53. See BENJAMIN FERENCZ, 1 AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP
TOWARD WORLD PEACE 88 (1980) (declaring that neither the validity of judgments
nor the fairness of the trial was diminished by the fact that the judges hailed from
the victor States).
54. See PERSICO, supra note 26, at 438 (stating that the "[International Military
Tribunal's] legitimacy can be attacked on purist legal grounds.") (emphasis
added). But see id. at 440 (excusing Nuremberg's application of the law since jus-
tice was satisfied).
55. See Orentlicher, International Crininal Law, supra note 5, at 705 (observ-
ing that Nuremberg marked the commencement of the general acknowledgement
that certain crimes are of universal concern and become the world's responsibility).
56. See ASKIN, supra note 35, at 98-99 (assigning Nuremberg fault for the in-
adequate procedural safeguards it provided the vanquished defendants). In Nurem-
berg, there was no right of appeal, the evidentiary rules were unrestrained, and the
attorneys provided to the defendants were typically American servicemen who had
insufficient training and experience. The ICTY and ICTR Statutes arguably reme-
died these flaws by implementing procedural protections that more closely follow
those announced in many international covenants and conventions, such as in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which relates to due process
and judicial procedure.
57. The full and proper designation of the ICTY is the International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991.
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B. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA
The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda... provide the hope of not only advances in international law similar
to Nuremberg and Tokyo, but advancements in the enforcement of interna-
tional law, where Nuremberg unfortunately failed to follow through. It was
not Nuremberg's failure. It was the failure of the international community to
follow up after Nuremberg.
On February 22, 1993, the Security Council of the UN decided
that the establishment of an international tribunal was necessary "for
the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law committed in the territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991."'9 The Resolution, commonly referred to as
Resolution 808, provided the UN Secretary-General no more than
sixty days to present the Security Council with "a report on all as-
pects of this matter, including specific proposals." 6°
Thereafter, on May 25, 1993, the Security Council adopted a sec-
ond Resolution, Resolution 827, which provided specific proposals
for the establishment of the Tribunal.6' Acting under its Chapter VII
powers contained in the UN Charter, the Security Council officially
called upon all States to "cooperate fully with the International Tri-
bunal and its organs in accordance with the present resolution and
the Statute of the International Tribunal."62 This mandate further re-
quired all States to "take any measures necessary under their domes-
tic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the
Statute.,
63
The importance of cooperation is critical when considering the
role that arrests, investigations, and detention assume in facilitating
58. Tina Rosenberg, Conference Convocation, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1383,
1407 (1998).
59. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993)
60. Id.
61. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute] (attaching the Statute governing the ICTY as an Ad-
dendum to this Resolution).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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criminal justice. With the issuance of these two Resolutions, the
world community witnessed the origination of the first war crimes
Tribunal since the Allies established similar judicial bodies immedi-
ately following World War II. This new Tribunal, however, differed
from its predecessors in several important respects. First, because the
ICTY was established prior to the cessation of hostilities in the For-
mer Yugoslavia and under the guise of Chapter VII of the UN Char-
ter-Articles 39 and 41-the Tribunal was considered a vehicle to
help "maintain and re-establish international peace and security."'
This origin, coming as it did from the full international community,
should immunize the ICTY from challenges of "victors' justice" that
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals continue to endure." An origi-
nation in the Security Council of the UN further suggests that the
establishment of the Tribunal is reflective of the will of the interna-
tional community. As such, there is an expectation-conspicuously
not yet realized-that the individual states comprising the UN will
64. KARiNE LESCURE & FLORENCE TRINTIGNAC, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE FOR
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 6 (1996).
In affirming that the situation generated by the virtually systematic breaches
of international humanitarian law in Former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to
international peace and security under the terms of Article 39 of Chapter VII,
the Security Council provided itself with the means to apply Article 41 of the
same chapter. This Article enables it, in such a situation, to take adequate
measures not involving the use of armed force. The measures actually quoted
are of an economic nature (complete or partial rupture of economic ties and
rail, sea and air links, etc.), but this is not exclusively the case because Article
41 also envisages the breaking of diplomatic relations. Although the creation
of a criminal jurisdiction may seem very far removed from such measures, the
formulation of the second sentence in Article 41 "these mnay include" clearly
shows the exemplary and non-restrictive nature of the list.
Id.
65. Id. at 3-4 (asserting that the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, due to its
birth from the Security Council, maintains both international and political creden-
tials, thus justice from that Tribunal will not be subject to the criticism of "victors'
justice," which tainted the Nuremberg proceedings); see also M. CHERIF
BAssiOuNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 201 (1996) (differentiating the Tribunal
for Former Yugoslavia from the Nuremberg proceedings since the former was es-
tablished by the Security Council of the UN instead of the victors of the war); su-
pra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing victors' justice, which was the
primary complaint of the Nuremberg proceedings).
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enforce the orders and judgments of the ICTY.66
The second main distinction between the ICTY and the World
War II Tribunals is the limitations on allowable penalties set forth in
the ICTY statute, which explicitly preclude imposing the death pen-
alty.67 Furthermore, the Tribunal emphasized, in its first Sentencing
Judgment, that the possible range of punishment is limited strictly to
imprisonment and that even fines, hard labor, and corporal punish-
ment are prohibited by the ICTY Statute.68 This limitation of impris-
onment necessarily mandates the establishment of a system for de-
tention to house convicted individuals. Currently, there is no
international or regional facility established for the incarceration of
persons convicted by an international tribunal or UN body.
The third distinction between the ICTY and the World War II Tri-
bunals is the availability of precedent. Because the judgments of
Nuremberg, Tokyo, and the proceedings under Control Council Law
No. 1069 are continually upheld and supported by the international
66. See Frederik Harhoff, Consonance or Rivalry? Calibrating the Efforts to
Prosecute War Crimes in National and International Tribunals, 7 DUKE J. COMIW.
& INT'L L. 571, 575 (1997) (suggesting that because the two ad hoc Tribunals
were enacted pursuant to the Security Council's Chapter VII powers, orders and
judgments issued by the Tribunals should be considered legally binding on the in-
dividual states under international law); see also The Honorable Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, The Eleventh Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture: The Changing Nature
of the Laws of War, 156 MIL. L. REv. 30, 35 (1998) (advocating a need for states
to be subject to a binding authority for violations of international law).
67. See RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES
TRIAL 31 (1971) (observing that the death penalty was a regularly exercised option
both at Nuremberg and Tokyo). Of the 25 men convicted by the Tokyo Tribunal,
seven received the death penalty. See id. Likewise, 11 defendants at Nuremberg
were sentenced to death by hanging. See TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 598-99. Ironi-
cally, the main complaint by defendants regarding the death penalty seemed to be
the manner of death imposed. See id. at 601-02 (reporting that the Nuremberg sol-
diers who were sentenced to death by hanging petitioned for the more honorable
death; death by firing squad).
68. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, IT-96-22-T, _I.L.R._
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Yugo. 1996) <http://www.un.org/icty> vacated on alternate
grounds, (limiting punishment to imprisonment).
69. See SCHARF, supra note 5, at 10 (discussing the issuance of Control Coun-
cil Law No. 10 subsequent to the creation of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg). This law permitted the prosecution of the "lesser" Nazi defendants,
such as low-level political and military leaders, businessmen, doctors, and jurists.
See id. (noting that these individuals were tried by military tribunals in the Allied-
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community, the leaders and soldiers involved in the Balkan massa-
cres cannot complain that the application of the laws of war consti-
tute ex post facto laws.70 The Nuremberg precedent, however ques-
tionable during the late 1940s, is now the accepted benchmark for
international criminal law. Perhaps the strongest legacy resulting
from Nuremberg is the punishment of war crimes and the prosecu-
tion of violators, as opposed to the apparent immunity the violators
previously enjoyed 1
The fourth distinction between the two modem ad hoc Tribunals
and the World War II Tribunals is that neither the ICTY nor the
ICTR72 are situated within the countries where the fighting, hostili-
ties, and war crimes occurred.73 Thus, the two modem Tribunals must
overcome challenges of transportation and limited access to victims,
witnesses, suspects, and investigators, each of whom rely on the
convenience of venue. Likewise, the UN Tribunals must overcome
the obstacle of "importing justice" to countries still suffering the af-
termath of war.74 The "international" Tribunals in The Hague and
occupied zones of Germany).
70. See Theodore Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocittes,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 562 (1995) (contending that Nuremberg is considered
binding precedent in spite of its application of ar post facto laws).
71. But see McCormack, supra note 39, at 730 (claiming that, although the in-
ternational community clamors for an effective international criminal law, no state
is willing to accept the broad jurisdiction that an international criminal court could
exercise over any State); but see also Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to
Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution and Truth Commissions, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 82 (1996) (recalling that 19 separate truth commissions
were established-as opposed to war crimes tribunals-to deal with internal
atrocities and crimes against humanity in the past 21 years).
72. The full and proper designation for the ICTR is the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Seri-
ous Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Viola-
tions Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States between 1 January and 31
December 1994.
73. See Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 49 (indicating that the Tribunal's foreign
location was a major point of contention for Rwandans). The placement of the Tri-
bunal in Arusha hinders many Rwandans from following the events and trials. See
id.
74. See Payam Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region
of Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal.for Rwanda, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 325, 342 (1997) (observing that the ICTR must begin to
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Arusha are removed from the site of conflict both physically and
symbolically. 75 The Judges and Prosecutors acting on behalf of the
UN are thus making decisions about each country from a comfort-
able distance unlike their Nuremberg predecessors who lived,
worked, and dispensed justice amidst the destruction.76
The most notable distinction between the ICTY and the other Tri-
bunals mentioned, including the ICTR, is the fact that war continued
to plague the Balkan region subsequent to the formation of the ICTY.
As recently as April 1999, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanian
refugees fled Kosovo under the threat of Serbian violence."' These
forced displacements resulted in a full-scale international crisis due
to the unavailability of food, clothing, shelter, and basic medical
supplies for many of the refugees.
The ICTY has been far from successful, after a six-year existence,
in restoring peace to the Balkan region. Many of the refugees whose
homes were burned, destroyed, or otherwise overtaken easily could
have proffered more appropriate uses for the millions of dollars the
UN has invested thus far in the ICTY. Those fleeing and being
forced from their homeland should be skeptical when the interna-
tional community promises that justice will be done.
Perhaps, at this point, the ICTY aptly demonstrates that criminal
reach into Rwanda by, first, utilizing the most accessible language in the region,
Kinyarwanda, and second, by employing the most accessible median in the region,
radio). The ICTR must be much more aggressive in disseminating information
about its work if it is to have any discernable impact on the reconciliation process.
See, e.g., id. (urging for the disbursement of information regarding the Tribunal
proceedings within Rwanda, which can be analogized to the need of the Former
Yugoslavia for such disbursement). A significant hurdle relating to the ICTY is
that the Tribunal's working languages, French and English, do not include any of
the native Serb-Croat languages of the Yugoslav region. See generally id. (dis-
cussing the need to disburse information in the language native to Rwandans).
75. See AIREY NEAVE, ON TRIAL AT NUREMBERG 43 (1978) (mentioning that
the symbolic location of Nuremberg should not go unnoticed). It was at Nurem-
berg, in 1938, that Hitler officially proclaimed the anti-Jewish laws that precipi-
tated the Holocaust. See id.
76. See id. at 43-47 (recognizing that the judges and prosecutors involved in
the proceedings at Nuremberg did their jobs amidst the aftermath of the war).
77. See ECONOMIST, supra note 15, at 17-18 (adding that, because of the vio-
lence, many Albanian politicians either were killed or in hiding, thus making the
achievement of a political solution more difficult).
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trials should not precede the end of conflict-at least not without
first securing the proper enforcement mechanisms necessary to ef-
fectuate justice. The first priority of the international community in
any war situation should be to cease the violence and to bring a de-
finitive end to war. Only then should we begin considering what to
do with those responsible for war atrocities.
C. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
Whenever we talk about the failures or shortcomings of some of these inter-
national efforts, I think it is important that we come to speak about the fail-
ures of the Member States that constitute the United Nations.'
Much like its sister institution, the ICTR was established by a UN
Security Council resolution pursuant to its Chapter VII powers.
Thus, despite the fact that the war in Rwanda was purportedly over,
the purpose of the Tribunal was, and presumably still is, to restore
peace and order to the country via criminal prosecutions. The process
of establishing the Rwandan Tribunal mirrored that previously at-
tempted at Leipzig, Nuremberg, Tokyo, and the Former Yugoslavia.
In each of these instances, including Rwanda, the UN established a
Commission of Inquiry to initially determine the feasibility and ad-
visability of creating a criminal tribunal.' Only in one instance, the
78. The Honorable Thogene Rudasingwa, Rwandan Ambassador to the United
States, The Rwanda Tribunal and its Relationship to National Trials in Rwanda, 13
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1469, 1485 (1998).
79. See infra note 83 (noting that Security Resolution 955 established the ICTR
in September 1994); see also Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Juris-
diction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & lNrr'L L. 349, 353 (1997) (ac-
knowledging that the UN adopted Resolution 955 approximately 16 months after
the establishment of the ICTY).
80. See Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 11-12 (cataloguing the five ad hoc inter-
national investigation commissions as follows: (1) the 1919 Commission on the
Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties- 1919
Commission preceding Leipzig; (2) the 1943 United Nations War Crimes Com-
mission-the predecessor to Nuremberg; (3) the 1946 Far Eastern Commission-
the predecessor to the Tokyo Tribunal; (4) the 1992 Commission of Experts Estab-
lished Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 to Investigate War Crimes and
other Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia-
the predecessor to the ICTY; and (5) the 1994 Independent Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 to Investigate Grave
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda-the
predecessor to the ICTR).
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1919 Commission, did the process permit a domestic court to serve
as the arbiter of justice. But, as previously observed, it is the very
failure observed at Leipzig that precludes domestic enforcement for
violations that have increasingly been characterized as international
crimes. Thus, there continues a trend of not appointing a domestic
court to enforce what increasingly is characterized as violations of
international crimes. 8' Hence, much like Nuremberg and the ICTY,
the ICTR is a reactionary body.82
Despite its recognition of need for international assistance, the
Rwandan government objected to the ultimate inception of the ICTR.
Initially, Rwanda requested that the Security Council establish an
international tribunal to assist it with the awesome task of rendering
justice after the genocide. Rwanda certainly recognized the need for
help but that help did not come in the form that the Rwandan gov-
ernment hoped for or expected. Thus, despite the need and desire for
international assistance, Rwanda ultimately cast the only negative
vote at the Security Council against Resolution 955, which estab-
lished the ICTR.83
Rwanda's reaction toward Resolution 955 signifies an important
breakdown in the international system.84 While the Rwandan people
81. See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Allies unsuc-
cessful attempts to prosecute war criminals following World War I).
82. See Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The
Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501, 501 (1996) (ob-
serving that atrocities are the most effective method for setting standards in the in-
ternational human rights arena). Furthermore, "[i]n a sense, the decision to estab-
lish these Tribunals is yet another expression of the reactive nature of the
international human rights system." Id.
83. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Session, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute] (attaching as an Addendum to this Resolution, the stat-
ute governing the ICTR). Ironically, or perhaps fortuitously, Rwanda was one of
the rotating at-large members of the Security Council at the time this issue was de-
cided. Its voice and presence, however, did not deter the creation of an institution it
did not welcome.
84. See Orentlicher, International Criminal Law, supra note 5, at 705-06 (dis-
cussing the conflict within the international community on the most appropriate
method of distributing justice following a period of genocide or internal atrocities).
Professor Orentlicher suggests that there is a very real paradox in operation at the
international level. See id. at 705 (recognizing that the Nuremberg principles now
are accepted as customary international law and illustrate the important principle
that certain crimes are universally condemned as reprehensible on the one hand,
[15:321
2000] ENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CRLI.%..IL LAi3
clearly desired international assistance, the perceived usurpation of
state sovereignty in dealing with the extraordinary circumstances ex-
perienced in the country posed a threat to Rwanda's control over
genocidal justice. One of the most vigorous challenges raised by
Rwanda was the fact that the UN Tribunal was expected to share a
single Prosecutor and a single Appeals Chamber with the ICTY."
This objection stemmed, in part, from the belief that the proposed
Statute already provided for so few ICTR personnel that the Tribunal
could not possibly fulfill its mandate. " Adding to Rwanda's frustra-
but pointing out that, on the other hand, responses to such crimes should meaning-
fully reflect the unique culture of the country in which the crimes occurred to ef-
fectively achieve its central aim of accountability). Although Professor Orentlicher
specifically discusses the appropriate method for dealing with the Khmer Rogue in
Cambodia, the reasoning is quite consonant with the situation in Rwanda where the
national legal system is defunct. See id. at 709 (observing that while conflicting
legal cultures should not deter the international community from pursuing prose-
cutions in Cambodia, the acknowledgement and understanding of such limitations
should cause the international community to proceed with caution). Likewise, the
international community must understand Rwanda's reluctance toward a UN-
dominated Tribunal in its contextual reality. See generally 1 TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J.
Kritz ed., 1995) (discussing the growing dilemma of international accountability).
85. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. PROSECUTING GENOCIDE
IN RWANDA (1997) [hereinafter LAWYERS' COMMITTEE] (noting the difficulties in
establishing a structure that efficiently deals with the problems in Kigali and
Arusha). The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights observed that -[b]uilding a
team of investigators, prosecutors, administrators and support personal in Kigali
and Arusha, which have limited infrastructure and where communications and
travel are difficult are expensive [endeavors]." Id.. see also Bassiouni, supra note
31, at 47 (observing that, although the ICTR and the ICTY statutes differ, the Tri-
bunals are similar in that they share a common prosecutor and a common Appel-
late Chamber). Moreover, "[t]his is a curious formula for two separate ad hoc Tri-
bunals established separately by the Security Council through two unrelated
resolutions." Id.; see also Ambassador Manzi Bakuramutsa, Identi.'ing and Prose-
cuting War Criminals: Two Case Studies-the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 631, 646-47 (1995) (reporting that the Rwandan
government wanted an increased number of trial chambers, as well as its own Ap-
peals Chamber and Prosecutor).
86. See Morris, supra note 79, at 355 (adding that several scholars questioned
the decision to provide the two ad hoc bodies with a single prosecutor); see also
Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 48 (contending that the single prosecutor is an insur-
mountable structural problem). Professor Bassiouni observes that -[t]he choice of a
single Prosecutor was particularly ill-advised because no person, no matter how
talented, can oversee two sets of prosecutions separated by 10,000 miles." Id. A
major impetus for utilizing only a single Prosecutor resulted from the many diffi-
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tion, the UN gave the ICTR primacy jurisdiction over domestic pro-
ceedings within Rwanda but located the proceedings outside of
87Rwandan territory. Primacy allows the ICTR, at any point during a
domestic proceeding, to request that the defendant and the entire
criminal proceeding be transferred to Arusha." Thus, upon request
by the ICTR, Rwanda must surrender its domestic authority over a
chosen defendant and defer its proceedings to the ICTR. This pale
hybrid of concurrent jurisdiction "may obstruct national catharsis by
frustrating popular expectations in the victim's country that justice
will be done under domestic law to those most responsible" 9 for the
genocide.
The second major objection raised by Rwanda was the statute's
prohibition of the death penalty.9° Although Rwanda has not utilized
the death penalty since 1982, the new Rwandan government indi-
cated its desire to resurrect the punishment for genocidal prosecu-
tions. This anomaly means that defendants prosecuted abroad will
likely receive a less grave sentence than those prosecuted domesti-
cally.9 Rwanda opposed this proscription against the death penalty
fearing that the ICTR would exercise its primacy jurisdiction against
the leaders and masterminds of the genocide, thereby leaving the
culties associated with the prolonged selection process for the ICTY Prosecutor.
See id.; see also Morris, supra note 79, at 356 (postulating that such delays in ar-
riving at a consensus for a second international Prosecutor surely would be pro-
nounced and would delay further the ICTR's work).
87. See Bakuramutsa, supra note 85, at 649 (stating that the main objectives of
the Tribunal were to teach the Rwandans to fight against impunity as well as to
promote national reconciliation, thus concluding that the seat of the international
Tribunal should be set in Rwanda).
88. See ICTR Statute, supra note 83, art. 8 (giving the ICTR primacy over do-
mestic courts in Rwanda).
89. Harhoff, supra note 66, at 573.
90. See Morris, supra note 79, at 356-57 (quoting the former Rwandan Ambas-
sador to the UN, Manzi Bakuramutsa, as stating that such disparate treatment for
the leaders of the genocide "is not conducive to national reconciliation in
Rwanda."); see also William A. Schabas, Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in
Post-Genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM.
L.F. 523, 553 (1996) (emphasizing that the exclusion of the death penalty is a par-
ticularly contentious point for Rwanda).
91. See generally Morris, supra note 79, at 356 (addressing the inequity that
may result from the Tribunal's exclusion of the death penalty and the Rwandan
court's inclusion of capital punishment).
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"lesser" defendants susceptible to a harsher penalty than those most
responsible for the Rwandan massacre.92
Finally, Rwanda took exception to the restricted temporal juris-
diction given to the ICTR.93 Unlike the ICTY Statute, which seem-
ingly provides an open-ended time frame for jurisdiction," the
Arusha Tribunal's mandate is limited to war crimes and atrocities
committed between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994. This
one-year period is inadequate to embrace the intricate events in-
volved in planning, inciting, and eventually implementing a geno-
cidal campaign95 that surpassed Hitler's campaign in terms of speed
and efficiency.96 Accordingly, Rwanda objected to the one-year man-
92. See Morris, supra note 79, at 356 (acknowledging the discrepancy that may
arise when those who merely played a role in the genocide are tried and sentenced
to death in Rwandan courts while the masterminds of the genocide are tried before
the Tribunal, thus escaping capital punishment); see also Bakuramutsa, supra note
85, at 648-49 (discussing the foreseeability of the fact that the leaders of the geno-
cide will be tried before the Tribunal and escape capital punishment while those
who carried out the plan will be subjected to execution); Schabas, supra note 90, at
553 (commenting that the Rwandans criticize the exclusion of the death penalty
claiming that severe injustice will result when the masterminds of the genocide es-
cape the death penalty).
93. See Bakuramutsa, supra note 85, at 645-46 (stating that the Rwandan gov-
ernment desired a jurisdictional mandate beginning on Oct. 1, 1990 and extending
through July 17, 1994).
94. See ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. I (setting forth the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal). The ICTY Statute provides that "[t]he International Tribunal shall have
the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991
in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute." Id. Thus, while the ICTY
Statute provides a starting point of 1991 for jurisdictional purposes, there is no ex-
press deadline for termination of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. See id. (lacking a date
for cession of jurisdiction). Arguably, the events occurring through 1999 are no
longer vulnerable to prosecution under the ICTY Statute.
95. See Morris, supra note 79, at 350-51 (describing the history of the Rwan-
dan conflict, particularly highlighting the planning stages that may have begun as
early as 1991).
96. See Akhavan, supra note 74, at 328-29 (discussing the strong planning and
organization that was present in Rwanda). It is estimated that Rwanda lost nearly
one million citizens in a mere three months. See id. at 328 (noting further that the
pre-genocide population of Rwanda was approximately seven and one half mil-
lion). The Rwandan representative to the UN Security Council suggested that the
genocide is comparable to a loss of over 37 million Americans in less than three
months. See id. at 328-39. "In its own gruesome way, such efficiency is an impres-
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date as compromising the true character of the Rwandan genocide
and placing an artificial limitation on the crimes committed. "7 While
Rwanda will likely prosecute persons domestically for activities pre-
ceding the ICTR jurisdictional period, the UN elected not to impose
criminal liability on persons whose actions predating January 1,
1994, ultimately culminated in genocidal acts.98
sive feat of organization, especially in a developing country. Accordingly, the
Rwandan genocide cannot simply be dismissed as an unforeseeable and spontane-
ous outburst of primordial bloodlust." Id.; see also LAWYERS' COMMITTEE, supqra
note 85 (arguing that the genocide in Rwanda may be the swiftest genocide in his-
tory); PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL
BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998) (setting forth a
riveting account of the genocide). Mr. Gourevitch writes:
Decimation means the killing of every tenth person in a population, and in the
spring and early summer of 1994 a program of massacres decimated the Re-
public of Rwanda. Although the killing was low tech-performed largely by
machete-it was carried out at a dazzling speed: of an original population of
about seven and a half million, at least eight hundred thousand people were
killed in just a hundred days. Rwandans often speak of a million deaths, and
they may be right. The dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the
rate of Jewish dead during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient mass kill-
ing since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Id.
97. See Morris, supra note 79, at 354 (discussing the importance of under-
standing not only the temporal jurisdiction, but also, the subject-matter jurisdiction
in evaluating Rwanda's objection to the one-year mandate). Furthermore,
[w]hile the ICTR was to have jurisdiction over actual killings, rapes, and
other acts constituting genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity
only if those acts were committed in 1994, it is likely that under the terms of
the ICTR Statute, the planning, preparation, or aiding and abetting of those
1994 acts also can form the basis for criminal liability through complicity,
even if that preparation occurred prior to 1994. Final determination of
whether that form of accomplice liability will be recognized by the ICTR as
coming within its temporal jurisdiction must await a judicial ruling. If the
aiding and abetting prior to 1994 of crimes that were completed in 1994 is
determined to come within the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR, then not
quite as much was lost by the limitation on the ICTR's temporal jurisdiction
as one might first have imagined. Nevertheless, even if that liberal interpreta-
tion of accomplice liability is adopted by the ICTR, there are certain crimes
that the Statute's temporal limitations will indeed exclude.
Id.
98. See id. at 353-54 (noting that the Former Rwandan Ambassador to the UN
argued that the one-year jurisdictional limitation would prevent the ICTR from
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The inherent shortcomings in the ICTR Statute, ironically, are
proving less debilitating than those difficulties experienced by The
Hague Tribunal." Rwanda and its African neighbors have been help-
ful in accommodating the mission of the ICTR to restore peace in the
previously war-tom country.1 0 Still, the ICTR should not be seen as a
panacea for the chaos that remains prevalent in Rwanda. The war
was, perhaps, only a symptom of a much larger problem. Now, as
Rwanda attempts to deal domestically with its more than 90,000 in-
mates awaiting trial on charges of genocide and related war crimes,""
fully capturing those atrocities that culminated in the genocide, observing that
"[t]hose activities ... began with planning and sporadic massacres... dating back
to 1990.").
99. The most clear distinction between the ICTR and ICTY is that the genocide
in Rwanda finally ended, creating a sufficient break to enable the detention of nu-
merous individuals. The high-ranking officials who feared domestic prosecution
fled to neighboring countries. Nevertheless, the ICTR managed to secure some of
the leaders and architects of the genocide. In stark contrast, the ICTY has been un-
able to secure a fair proportion of high-ranking officials who remain indicted but at
large. The inability of the international community to assist in arresting or detain-
ing these suspects easily is attributed to the fact that the fighting in the Former
Yugoslavia has ended only recently. Unlike the World War II institutions, the
ICTY is attempting to bring justice to a region just beginning to recover from war
and violence. The deterrent effect of this institution clearly has not been realized.
100. See ICTR/INFO-9-2-162 (visited Aug. 23, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Docs
sc.htm> (indicating that Eliezer Niyitegeka, former Minster of Information during
the Interim Government, was arrested by Kenyan law enforcement officials); see
also ICTR/INFO-9-2-167 (visited Aug. 23, 1999) <http://www.un.org/
Docs/sc.htm> (noting the arrest in Nairobi of Dr. Casimir Bizimungu, former
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Health in Rwanda); ICTR/INFO-9-2-
176 (visited Aug. 23, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Docstsc.htm> (describing the ar-
rest of three ICTR defendants in Cameroon-Jerome Bicamumpaka, former Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, Prosper Mugiraneza, former Minister Responsible for
Civil Service, and, Justin Mugenzi, former Minister of Commerce).
101. See Morris, supra note 79, at 357 (discussing the difficulties in attempting
to obtain an accurate estimate of the number of individuals currently held domesti-
cally by Rwandan authorities). Professor Morris observed that Rwanda must now
face "the enormous problem of how to handle the other 90,000-plus criminal cases
arising from the Rwandan genocide." Id. Professor Morris further noted the unfea-
sibility of full trials for the multitude of defendants, who constitute more than one
percent of the national population, since such a feat would be infeasible even for
nations possessing great wealth. See id. at 361 (recognizing, at the same time, the
opposite extreme of releasing the prisoners under a grant of amnesty, which is an
unacceptable solution to the survivors and constitutes a security risk for the coun-
try); see also Akhavan, supra note 74, at 339 (stating that because of limited re-
sources, it is futile to think that the Tribunal is able to replace the role of the
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the international community must send a signal that it will not disap-
point the Rwandans a second time. While we failed to intervene
during the catastrophe and assist when assistance could have stalled,
or even prevented the genocide, we are at a point where international
justice can finally contribute to healing in Rwanda.""2 To be effective,
however, the international community must demonstrate a commit-
ment-in actions and not words alone' ° 3-to the rule of law that lies
dormant today in Rwanda.'0
D. ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Until we are certain that international crimes will be prosecuted and pun-
ished, justice will not be done .... [T]his affects us not only because of
our values, but also because of the amount of attention and resources that
the international community must devote to these man-made tragedies."'
Rwandan domestic courts in proceeding with fair trials for the approximately
85,000 people presently detained).
102. See Akhavan, supra note 74, at 332 (asserting that the genocide of 1994
was not a surprise for the international community). Moreover,
[iut was the culmination of many years of cynical indifference and willful
blindness to the plight of the Rwandan people .... It is apparent that ex post
facto punishment of genocide is no substitute for effective preventative ac-
tion. The establishment of the Rwanda Tribunal cannot undo the damage that
resulted from the failure to intervene. Nor can it now bring instantaneous re-
lief through justice and reconciliation to a society traumatized beyond imagi-
nation. If the Tribunal has brought instantaneous relief, it has been for the
benefit of the spectators whose conscience has been eased, and whose cre-
dentials as 'civilized nations' have been reaffirmed. In the wake of such a
monstrous cataclysm, the achievements of the Tribunal in the short-term can
be described as modest, at best.
Id. at 332.
103. See Bakuramutsa, supra note 85, at 650 (reporting that, because the inter-
national community did not respond to the genocide, Rwanda believed that the
community's sole interest in establishing the Tribunal was to ease its own con-
science); see also Richard Goldstone, Assessing the Work of the United Nations
War Crimes Tribunals, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1997) (commenting that many
view the ICTY as a vehicle for the international community to hide behind, realiz-
ing its feeble effort in aiding the people of the Former Yugoslavia).
104. See Goldstone, supra note 103, at 5 (contending that "[n]ational reconcilia-
tion can be achieved only if accountable justice is established and if the survivors
of the genocide are assured that what has happened will never happen again.").
105. Claudio Grossman, Conference Convocation, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1383, 1386 (1998).
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In determining the desirability of an international court, it is not
enough to complain that "justice" demands such a creation. Rather,
the international community must consider the existing precedents
previously discussed and analyze whether a permanent institution
will rectify, or merely perpetuate, the inefficient distribution of inter-
national criminal justice.06
It is important to note that international law is not really law at
all-at least not in the traditional legislative or penal sense.'"' Rather,
international law is a symbiotic fusion of law, politics, and the com-
peting interests of sovereignty.'O' From an academic perspective, in-
ternational law is that which has been accepted by states as binding
behavior, either due to custom or treaty, and that which is believed or
considered to be binding on states as evidenced by state practice."
106. See McCormack, supra note 39, at 731 (noting that previous attempts to
prosecute international crimes often fall victim to national interests and the "sta-
tist" system of international politics).
107. While this may appear to be a slightly radical statement for an international
lawyer to make, the impetus behind this statement is the belief that there truly can-
not be law where there is no requirement that the purported legal standards apply
to each nation. For example, international legal obligations are based solely on
treaty obligations, which permit certain states to "opt out" of proscribed conduct,
thus states are not bound to apply standards with which they disagree. Further-
more, there are no coercive enforcement mechanisms upholding violations of law.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 795 (5th ed. 1979) (defining law as "[t]hat which
must be obeyed and followed by citizens subject to sanctions or legal conse-
quences."); see also id. (defining law as "... a body of rules of action or conduct
prescribed by controlling authority, and having binding legal force."). But see id. at
733 (defining international law as "[t]he law which regulates the intercourse of na-
tions; the law of nations."). The definition further states that international law is
"[t]he customary law which determines the rights and regulates the intercourse of
independent nations in peace and war." Id.
108. See Louis Henkin, Conceptualiing Violence: Present and Future Devel-
opments in International Law, 60 ALB. L. REv. 571, 577 (1997) (describing the
limitations of international law). Mr. Henkin contends that international law deals
with issues in politics, not issues of law. See id. (postulating that, although the pos-
sibility of establishing an International Criminal Court came about by political
force, the same political force has the power to limit significantly the powers and
authority of this body).
109. See ROHT-ARRLAZA, supra note 33, at 39-40 (describing the concept as one
commonly referred to as opinio juris). However, general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations likewise provide a legal source in international law. Id.
at 46-49; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 (1997) (describing sources of international law including
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While international tribunals purport to be acting pursuant to "law,"
their respective activities are constrained and limited by the logistical
nuances of an international community."0 To have law, there must
exist mechanisms capable of enforcing that law."' Otherwise, the
"law" is no more than a code of civility that exists at the whim of
each independent nation-state."12 It is the "victor's justice" para-
digm." 3 Law without enforcement relies on the altruistic nature of
custom and general principles of law); Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old
Atrocities: An Inquiy in International Law, 87 GEO. L.J. 707, 726-27 (1999)
(stating that the history of how states deal with addressing abuses of the past is at
the core of international criminal law, which is borne from customary law or inter-
national standards). See generally FARHAD MALEKIAN, THE MONOPOLIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 37 (1995) (observing that international criminal
law is borne from customary or international standards); Anthony Clark Arend, Do
Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics, 38 VA. J. INT'L
L. 107, 141-42 (1998) (discussing generally that international legal rules are so-
cially constructed).
110. See generally Lucas W. Andrews, Sailing Around the Flat Earth: The In-
ternational Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 471,
471-511 (1997) (commenting on the continued and flagrant impunity enjoyed by
the two main Serbian defendants, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, and how
their impunity clearly illustrates the role that political will plays in enforcing inter-
national criminal law). Mr. Andrews asserts that, to operate effectively, the Tribu-
nal requires cooperation of states. See id. at 511. Likewise, despite repeated re-
quests, the ICTR and UN failed to encourage a United States District Court in
Texas to release the Rwandan defendant, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, although
statutorily obligated to do so. See infra note 149, at 410-12. The UN has not taken
formal action against the United States as a result of its refusal to release this pris-
oner.
111. Robert 0. Weiner, Trying to Make Ends Meet: Reconciling the Law and
Practice of Human Rights Amnesties, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 857, 857 (1995) (main-
taining that international law suffers from a credibility problem, which stems from
the chasm between written law and practice and is made worse by the international
attention it receives).
112. See WESLEY CRAGG, THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT: TOWARDS A THEORY
OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 102 (1992) (reminding that no legal system can exist
when people choose the laws that they wish to obey). Furthermore, unless the peo-
ple subject to the legal system generally abide by its laws, a legal system, likewise,
cannot exist. See id. (observing basic elements required for a successful legal sys-
tem).
113. Some of the strongest evidence in support of this statement is the double
standard applied immediately following World War II. Although the customary
international law embodied in the Geneva Conventions at the time unequivocally
proscribed the massive and random destruction of civilian populations, the United
States intentionally decimated two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with-
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nation-states to peaceably co-exist in a world where economic scar-
city and power struggles predominate." 4 Law without enforcement is
destined to fail."5
During a meeting in Rome in the summer months of 1998, the in-
ternational community comprised of various state representatives,
scholars, dignitaries, and nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"),
reached agreement that a permanent international criminal court was
necessary. The representatives of the meeting memorialized this
agreement in a document commonly referred to as "The Rome Stat-
ute.'1' u 7 Yet, even with the benefit of hindsight and the limited guid-
ance of two existing ad hoc Tribunals, the international community
out reproach. Although the conduct and actions of the United States during World
War II were arguably criminal, those actions were not condemned in an interna-
tional setting because the "law" that existed was applied only against the van-
quished. This event illustrates the limitations of international law. Rarely in our
history is international law applied against a powerful nation. The United States,
more than any other single nation, has managed to evade its obligations under in-
ternational law with continued success and impunity. Such immunity undermines
the legal system in which the world community operates.
114. See Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law,
33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 237, 256 (1998) (cautioning that the current system merely per-
petuates the monopolization of criminal enforcement by powerful states against
other states and their citizens). Mr. Ratner further argues that decisions involving
international criminal justice to achieve some form of accountability primarily lies
with an elite group of nation-states. See id. (contending that those decision-making
states will rarely implicate themselves for human rights violations).
115. See generally Orentlicher, Settling Accounts. supra note 52, at 2542 (dis-
cussing the importance of enforcement). Professor Orentlicher emphasizes that,
without enforcement, there is no deterrence effect from the law since there is no
mechanism for creating authority of the law itself. See id.; see also Joel Feinberg,
The Expressive Functions of Punishment, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 77 (R. A.
Duff & David Garland eds., 1994) (averring that breaching a statute without pun-
ishment results in the loss of character of the law); Ratner, supra note 114, at 256
(observing that it is futile to create laws that are not enforced since the result does
not really create a law in which people will abide).
116. See Leila Sadat Wexler, A First Look at the 1998 Rome Statute /br a Per-
manent International Criminal Court: Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimnes, Structure
and Referrals to the Court, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 655 (Cherif Bas-
siouni ed., 1998) (reporting on the development of the Rome Statute).
117. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, Rome Statute on the International Criminal
Court, 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/189/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998)
[hereinafter Rome Statute] (establishing the International Criminal Court).
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again ignored the fact that law cannot exist without enforcement.
Much like its predecessor judicial bodies, the International Criminal
Court ("ICC") envisions a world where nation-states will assist one
another in the implementation and enforcement of international
law.118
Under the current sovereignty-based system, this forecasted
structure is premature and possibly misguided.1 9 The ICTY and
ICTR both suffer from significant limitations based on the failure to
spontaneously achieve or coerce international cooperation from indi-
vidual states. This failure is most evident in the impotency of the en-
forcement provisions at the respective Tribunals. Article 29 of the
ICTY Statute requires that nation-states fully cooperate in the en-
forcement of arrests and sentences. Article 28 of the ICTR Statute
contains a nearly identical requirement. 2' This cooperation, despite
its statutory mandate, has not been forthcoming. As will be addressed
more fully below, neither Tribunal has been able to compel nation-
118. Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal
Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665, 703-05 (1996) [hereinafter Sadat
Wexler, The Proposed Permanent ICC] (setting forth the intended reliance of the
International Criminal Court on nation-states for enforcement).
119. See Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecu-
tion and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 2, 11 (1998) (reasoning that the hesitance of states to enforce international
criminal law as set forth by international tribunals is not surprising since such en-
forcement encroaches on state sovereignty in the hallowed area of criminal law).
120. See ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 29 (requiring cooperation from states
in the investigation and prosecution of international humanitarian law violations).
Article 29 provides that:
1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation
and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or
an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to:
(a) the identification and location of persons;
(b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence;
(c) the service of documents;
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal.
Id. (emphasis added).
121. See ICTR Statute, supra note 83, art. 28 (requiring virtually the same level
of cooperation from nation-states as Article 29 of the ICTY Statute).
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states to assist with, or cooperate in, enforcing international arrest
warrants issued by the Tribunal. While the ICTR has been more suc-
cessful in receiving cooperation relating to arrests,'"- the ICTY pro-
ceedings have been stagnated severely by an inability to secure the
arrest and detention of high-profile defendants."'
Likewise, the Tribunals have been unable to obtain any significant
cooperation from nation-states to assist in the enforcement of sen-
tences. 24 Because the UN does not maintain any permanent prison
facilities and the Tribunals merely constitute ad hoc bodies, the Tri-
bunals must rely on outside states and institutions to enforce their
judgments. In this regard, both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes provide
that
[i]mprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the International
Tribunal from a list of States, which have indicated to the Security Coun-
cil their willingness to accept convicted persons. Such imprisonment shall
be in accordance with the applicable law of the State concerned, subject to
the supervision of the International Tribunal.'"
Neither Tribunal has been successful in securing agreements to en-
force the announced sentences. To date, only four states, Italy, Fin-
land, Norway and, Sweden, have agreed to accept prisoners from the
122. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting, with particularity, the
assistance provided by Kenya and Cameroon).
123. See id. (reporting that, only recently, since July 1997, were several high-
profile defendants arrested and transferred).
124. See Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent ICC, supra note 118, at 707.
125. ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 27. The ICTR Statute provides one im-
portant distinction. Unlike the ICTY Statute, which seemingly precludes impris-
onment within the Former Yugoslavia, the ICTR Statute provides in pertinent part
that "[i]mprisonment shall be served in Rwanda or any of the States on a list of
States which have indicated to the Security Council their willingness to accept
convicted persons, as designated by the International Tribunal for Rwanda." ICTR
Statute, supra note 83, art. 26 (emphasis added). However, as Rwandan prisons are
currently incapable of handling the overflow of domestic suspects, it is unlikely
that the ICTR will return any convicted individuals to Rwanda for imprisonment.
Even if space in the domestic prisons was available, there is no indication that
Rwanda meets the minimal UN standards for prisoners. This additional shortcom-
ing likely will dissuade the Tribunal further from sending ICTR convicts back to
Rwanda. As a UN body, the place of imprisonment must be suitable under UN
minimum standards.
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ICTY.'2 6 And, only two nation-states, Mali and Benin, have indicated
their willingness to accept prisoners from the Arusha Tribunal. '27 Yet,
both Statutes unequivocally require that states comply "without un-
due delay" in the "arrest or detention of persons."'
28
If we are to realize the aspiration that international law and an ICC
can effectively assist our world community in the achievement of
peace and the recognition of human rights, we must honestly assess
the feasibility such ICC offers. In making this assessment, it is im-
perative that we analyze the role that international criminal tribunals
play in the furtherance of human rights. If the goal is strictly peda-
gogical, there is some support that international tribunals effectively
establish an accurate record for posterity. 29 If, however, the goal is to
126. See Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess.,
Agenda Item 49, at VIII (1997) [hereinafter Fourth Annual Report] (indicating that
Italy was the first state to provide agreement regarding use of its prison facilities
on Feb. 6, 1997). Thereafter, on May 7, 1997, Finland signed an agreement offer-
ing use of its domestic prison facilities. See id. Norway became the third cooper-
ating state when it signed an agreement to assist in the enforcement of sentences on
April 24, 1998. Sweden became the fourth European nation to accept ICTY pris-
oners on February 18, 1999. See ICTY Press Release: Sweden to Become Fourth
State to sign an Agreement on the Enforcement of Sentences (Feb. 18, 1999)
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p382-e.htm>.
127. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (confirming that only the Mali
government signed an agreement regarding the enforcement of ICTR sentences on
Feb. 12, 1999, despite the numerous statements from states purportedly "willing"
to accept ICTR prisoners); see also ICTR website located at <http://www.ictr.org>.
This information can be gleaned from the ICTR fact sheet, which is updated regu-
larly.
128. See supra note 120 (providing the full text to Article 29); see also ICTR
Statute, supra note 83, art. 28 (requiring, like the ICTY Statute, that "States shall
comply without undue delay with any request for assistance.., including, but not
limited to: ... (d) The arrest or detention of persons.") (emphasis added).
129. See Goldstone, supra note 103, at 6 (citing indictment and arrest rates of
Yugoslavian and Rwandan Tribunals, and recognizing "systematic mass rape" as a
war crime); see also Howland & Calathes, supra note 22, at 150 (declaring that the
Rwandan Tribunal contributed to overall justice by developing the world's under-
standing of human rights by means of the media); Landsman, supra note 7 1, at 83
(pointing out the virtues of prosecution as a means of educating people about the
nature and extent of wrongdoing, and establishing a record of what truly hap-
pened); McDonald, supra note 66, at 44 (asserting that the Tribunal has the im-
portant duties of establishing a historical record of the occurrences in the Former
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administer criminal law and bring the perpetrators of human rights
atrocities to justice, we must consider the limited success that inter-
national criminal tribunals have achieved in reaching these goals.' "'
While the creation of an ICC is being welcomed by most of the
international community, there remain skeptics."' If the forthcoming
ICC fails to remedy those components of Nuremberg, Tokyo, the
ICTY, and the ICTR that have plagued the pursuit of justice, the ICC
will merely perpetuate these failings. It is imperative that scholars
and jurists learn from the mistakes of the past and build upon exist-
ing precedent to create an effective juridical body. Successful prose-
cution of criminal law requires enforcement. At present, the Rome
Statute does not address the issue of enforcement in any measurable
fashion. The distinctions between the ICTY, ICTR, and Rome Stat-
ute relating to enforcement are minimal." This oversight discounts a
Yugoslavia, and ascertaining what caused the perpetration of such heinous crimes
against humanity in order for the Tribunal to promote peace and security).
130. See Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 12-13 (advocating the need for establish-
ing a permanent, independent, international criminal justice system to establish a
record so that mistakes of the past will not recur in the future). In order to establish
such a system, Professor Bassiouni asserts that politics must be put aside. See id.
(requiring further, cooperation of the individual states to establish an independent,
international criminal law regime); see also Orentlicher, International Criminal
Law, supra note 5, at 711 (concluding that the international community must come
together and demand justice for human rights violations to properly give meaning
to the vow "Never Again").
131. See Brian T. Hildreth, Hunting the Hunters: The United Nations Unleashes
Its Latest Weapon in the Fight Against Fugitive War Crimes Suspects-Rule 61, 6
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 499, 505 (1998) (averring that, even if a permanent in-
ternational criminal court existed, state cooperation remains critical to ensure that
defendants are brought before the court); see also McCormack, supra note 39, at
730 (stating that the ICC is not accepted fully as having "broad jurisdiction" over
defendants); Sadat Wexler, supra note 118, at 679-80 (hypothesizing that the es-
tablishment of the ICC is opposed because of a belief that a large number of crimes
would be left outside of the court's jurisdiction).
132. See Rome Statute, supra note 117, arts. 86-102 (setting forth cooperation
requirements). Article 86 sets forth the "general obligation to cooperate" as fol-
lows: "State Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooper-
ate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court." Id. art. 86. Article 93 requires similar individual meas-
ures of cooperation to those seen in Articles 29 and 28 of the ICTY and ICTR
Statutes, respectively. Article 93 mandates that:
1. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and under
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truth that has been tested repeatedly and consistently demonstrated,
namely, that left to their own desires and devices, nation-states will
continue to pursue their own self-interests at the cost of enforcing
international law.' As a world community, we are surely capable of
more. In an attempt to offer more, I will next consider the two exist-
ing ad hoc tribunals in search of future guidance. The apparent lack
procedures of national law, comply with requests by the Court to provide the
following assistance in relation to investigations or prosecutions:
(a) The identification and whereabouts of persons or the location of items;
(b) The taking of evidence, including testimony under oath, and the produc-
tion of evidence, including expert opinions and reports necessary to the Court;
(c) The questioning of any person being investigated or prosecuted;
(d) The service of documents, including judicial documents;
(e) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses or experts
before the Court;
(f) The temporary transfer of persons as provided in paragraph 7;
(g) The examination of places or sites, including the exhumation and exami-
nation of grave sites;
(h) The execution of searches and seizures;
(i) The provision of records and documents, including official records and
documents;
(j) The protection of victims and witnesses and the preservation of evidence;
(k) The identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property
and assets and instrumentalitiesof crimes for the purpose of eventual forfei-
ture, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties;and
(1) Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the re-
quested State, with a view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Id. art. 93; see also supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (discussing the
provisions of Article 28 of the ICTR Statute, and Article 29 of the ICTY Statute).
Most problematic, however, is the continued reliance on "willing" states to enforce
the sentences of imprisonment issued by the Court. In Article 103, the Rome Stat-
ute again relies on individual states to enforce the Court's judgments. See Rome
Statute, supra note 117, art. 103, para. 1 (declaring that "[a] sentence of imprison-
ment shall be served in a State designated by the Court from a list of States which
have indicated to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced persons."). But
see id. art. 103, para. 4 (providing, as though envisioning the dilemma currently
before the two ad hoc Tribunals, that "[i]f no State is designated under paragraph
1, the sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a prison facility made available
by the host State, in accordance with the conditions set out in the headquarters
agreement referred to in article 3, paragraph 2 .... [t]he costs arising out of the
enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment shall be borne the Court.").
133. Louis Ren& Beres, Iraqi Crimes During and After the Gulf War: The Im-
perative Response of International Law, 15 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 675,
683 (1993) (calling for prosecution of Iraqi war criminals based on the Nuremberg
precedent). Such prosecutions, however, were never accomplished. Id.
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of enforcement and arrest powers, the difficulty and disparity in
sentencing issues, and the problems created by reliance on state co-
operation for detention are, and continue to be, the main impedi-
ments to both institutions. The treatment-and eventual remedy-of
these crucial issues likely will determine the final assessment of The
Hague and Arusha Tribunals.'
II. THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT: EXPOSING
THE GREATEST WEAKNESS
Sometimes the state goes on record through its statutes, in a way that
might well please a conscientious citizen in whose name it speaks, but
then owing to official evasion and unreliable enforcement gives rise to
doubts that the law really means what it says."'
Much can be said about the ICTY and ICTR, as much has been
expected. Neither institution has provided the remedy envisaged by
the Security Council or the participating states. Hence, it is not disin-
genuous to assert that both Tribunals have fallen far short, at least at
this time, of their respective expectations. There is still ongoing war
and conflict in both regions.3 6 There is the continued commission of
war crimes and crimes against humanity in both regions, as well as in
many other nations.3 7 Peace and security have not been restored to
either community. And, due to budget constraints and various other
logistical problems, very few convictions have been forthcoming
from either body. In a very real sense, justice has not been delivered
to either the Former Yugoslavia or Rwanda. We again are on the
134. The realization that the present system has not worked well in bringing in-
ternational criminals to justice should temper the increasing momentum of an in-
ternational criminal institution. Without losing any of the existing enthusiasm, it is
necessary to candidly assess the limitations of an international criminal system to
rectify the shortcomings to ensure that the ultimate endeavor is a success.
135. Feinberg, supra note 115, at 79.
136. See Alan Cowell, Its a Wonder this Alliance is Unified, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
25, 1999, at 5 (describing NATO's activities in the Balkan region as the first "true
combat mission" NATO undertook in its 50-year existence); see also Howland &
Calathes, supra note 22, at 151 n.60 (describing the ongoing conflict in Rwanda).
137. See, e.g. ANGOLA, supra note 12, at 88; CAMBODIA, supra note 24, at 137
(detailing the continuing war crimes violations committed in each respective re-
gion).
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brink of failure.
A. LACK OF ARRESTS AND OUTSTANDING INDICTMENTS
It is mostly the question of enforceability that weakens the body of inter-
national criminal law.'
When the International Military Tribunal began its proceedings at
Nuremberg, the hostilities had ceased and the capture of defendants
was accomplished with very little incident.' " The modem Tribunals,
however, must contend with the fact that their access to the accused
occurs at the will of each respective state providing refuge to the de-
fendants.' 40 Many of the perpetrators of these war crimes have fled to
neighboring countries where they believed they would find a safe
haven.' 4' There is no vanquished population from which to pear down
defendants.' 42 This shortcoming has made the arrest of many ICTY
138. MALEKIAN, supra note 109, at 56.
139. See The Fifth Annual Ernst C. Steifel Symposium, 1945-1995: Critical
Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trials and State Accountability, 12 N.Y.L. ScIi. J.
HUM. RTs. 631, 637 (1995) (reporting that the accused in the Nuremberg trial were
in the custody of the Tribunal).
140. See 970507IT Transcript (visited Aug. 21, 1999) <http://www.un.org/icty/
transel/970507IT.txt> (pointing out that the first defendant that the International
Tribunal arrested and subsequently turned over to The Hague authorities by Ger-
many was Dusko Tadic). Likewise, Zambian officials arrested Jean-Paul Akayesu,
outside of Rwanda and turned him over to the ICTR. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
ICTR-96-4-T (1998) (visited Aug. 21, 1999) <http://www.un.org/ictr/english/
judgments/akayesu.html> (reporting the capture and arrest of a Rwandan war
criminal). Similarly, Kenyan officials arrested Jean Kambanda outside of Rwanda
and turned him over to the ICTR. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, ICTR-97-23-S
(1998) (visited Aug. 21, 1999) <http://www.un.org/ictr/english/judgments/ kam-
banda.html> (reporting the arrest of an indicted Rwandan war criminal).
141. See ICTY, ICTY Latest List of Detainees (Dec. 22, 1999)
<http://www.un.org/icty/glance/list3.htm> [hereinafter ICTY Fact Sheet] (indicat-
ing that, of the 33 individuals currently detained by the ICTY, only 3 were arrested
by states outside the Balkan region). Likewise, of the 38 individuals in ICTR cus-
tody, 14 individuals were arrested in Kenya, 9 in Cameroon, 3 in Zambia, 2 in
Belgium, 2 in Togo, 2 in Cote d'Ivoire, 2 in Benin, I in Switzerland, I in Burkina
Faso, 1 in Mali, 1 in Namibia, and 1 in South Africa. See supra note 100 and ac-
companying text (providing a breakdown of the defendants currently in ICTR
custody).
142. See Kenneth J. Harris & Robert Kushen, Surrender of Fugitives to the War
Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Squaring International Legal Obli-
gations with the U.S. Constitution, 7 CRIM. L.F. 561, 562 (1996) (noting that, un-
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and ICTR defendants problematic. To date, public indictments issued
by the ICTY, name sixty-six separate defendants."' Of those named,
only thirty-three defendants are in custody at the ICTY holding fa-
cility, awaiting trial.'" Similarly, the ICTR has issued twenty-eight
public indictments, implicating forty-eight separate defendants."'
Thirty-eight of these individuals are in ICTR custody. This dilemma
is a direct result of the lack of coercive enforcement provisions
within the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.
Further, neither Tribunal has a police force or prison unit to assist
in the physical component of its work."' Instead, the ICTY and ICTR
are forced to rely on the participation and cooperation of states
and/or NATO forces 47 to assist them in the performance of their du-
like in World War II where the Allies caused the defendants to surrender, the cur-
rent Tribunals must rely entirely on state cooperation to arrest and surrender de-
fendants).
143. See ICTY Fact Sheet, supra note 141 (acknowledging that there are an un-
known number of private indictments that remain "under seal" at the Tribunal).
144. See id., supra note 141 (stating that, in August 1998, Drazen Erdemovic
was transferred to Norway to serve his sentence following exhaustion of appeal).
145. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, PRESS & PUBLIC
AFFAIRS UNIT, Fact Sheet No. 1: The Tribunal at a Glance (July 1999)
<http://vw.ictr.org/ENGLISH/factsheetstfactshee.htm> (indicating the number
of indictments the ICTR handed down).
146. See Anne L. Quintal, Rule 61: The " Voice of the ictims Screams " Out fbr
Justice, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 723, 734 (1998) (addressing the fact that
neither Tribunal has its own prison facilities).
147. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Swapping Amnesty for Peace and the Dun' to
Prosecute Human Rights Crines, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 713, 715 (1997)
[hereinafter Orentlicher, Swapping Annesn'] (discussing the commitment of Yugo-
slavian, Bosnian, and Croatian governments to cooperate with the Tribunal in the
Dayton Peace Agreements). Scholars harshly criticized the work of NATO police
forces given their apparent impotence in this area. See id. (condemning the work of
NATO's IFOR forces). Professor Orentlicher insists that:
[f]or its part IFOR has made a shameful mockery of its professed policy to
arrest suspects indicted by the Hague Tribunal if they are "encountered." One
United States commander asserted that his troops would arrest suspects like
Radovan Karadzic only if they literally stumble into an IFOR checkpoint. In
fact, the record suggests that IFOR would not even arrest indicted suspects
under these circumstances.... [T]he costs of this de facto impunity include
an intangible, but potentially serious, erosion of the Hague Tribunal's author-
ity. Just as the craven acquiescence in "ethnic cleansing" by the United Na-
tions Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia deeply compromised the
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ties.'48 This limitation has proven much more serious than apparently
anticipated during the drafting of the respective Tribunal Statutes.
For example, the United States still refuses to turn over Elizaphan
Ntakirutimana, a named ICTR defendant, despite repeated requests
from the Tribunal and the UN.' 49 No mechanism currently exists to
compel compliance from the United States under the Statute's re-
quirements.5 Again, the limitations of international law are demon-
credibility of the United Nations, a continuing failure to secure the arrest of
suspects indicted by the Hague Tribunal will surely diminish its hard earned
credibility and its ability to advance healing in Bosnia.
Id. at 716-17. Professor Orentlicher provides two further examples of the inertia of
IFOR. First, she explains that the most senior Croat official, Dario Kordic, lived in
a government-owned apartment in Croatia without capture. Id. at 715. Although
Mr. Kordic eventually surrendered himself to The Hague Tribunal, he lived suc-
cessfully without arrest for nearly two years. See Prosecutor v. Kordic, Indictment
(visited Aug. 22, 1999) <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/10-11-95.htm>
(listing Mr. Kordic's indictment date). Second, Professor Orentlicher cites Ivica
Rajic, an indicted ICTY alleged defendant who lived for almost a year in a hotel
owned by the Croatian Defense Ministry. See Orentlicher, Swapping Amnesty, su-
pra note 147. Although The Hague Tribunal indicted Mr. Rajic on August 23,
1995, he has successfully avoided capture for over four years and remains at large;
see also Quintal, supra note 146, at 759 (suggesting that the Tribunals should
amend their Rules to give SFOR "more power to arrest the war criminals" or re-
quire that automatic sanctions are instituted against non-compliant states).
148. See Jelena Pejic, The Tribunal and the ICC: Do Precedents Matter?, 60
ALB. L. REv. 841, 846-53 (1997) (discussing the need for tribunals to rely on
states' assistance in carrying out their duties).
149. Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdic-
tion of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L.
383, 411-12 (1998) (discussing complications involved in the surrender of Eli-
zaphan Ntakirutimana).
150. Once again the international community is confronted with the concept that
large and powerful nations may evade their responsibilities under international
law. See supra notes 108-115 (discussing that the problems with enforcement of
international criminal law stem from the fact that states are unwilling to give up
their own sovereignty in the area of criminal law). Rule 59 of the ICTR Rules of
Procedure and Evidence allows the Tribunal to demand adherence by a state, and if
refused, the Tribunal may petition the Security Council to make the demand. See
INT'L CRIM. TRIB. RWANDA, R. 59 (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http://www.un
.org/ictr/rules.html> (allowing the Security Council to step in for assistance in en-
forcement at the Tribunal's request). However, because the United States is one of
five permanent members of the Security Council, action taken against the United
States is unlikely in this matter. The ICTR is left to wait for the United States to
comply with its request and hope that compliance comes quickly. See LAWYERS'
COMMITTEE, supra note 85, at IV; see also THEODORE MERON, WAR CRIMES
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strated when political will undermines e m '"
The continued inertia and ambivalence demonstrated toward en-
forcement by the international community is inexplicable. Although
the political will existed to establish a criminal tribunal for the pur-
poses of trying individuals accused of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, the political will apparently does not exist to arrest and
detain such individuals to enable the Tribunals to function as de-
signed.'52 It is disconcerting to imagine that an international criminal
court sits idle because the international community, both individually
and collectively, refuses to risk the consequences of enforcement.'"
Few, if any, legal systems exist where arrests are not considered a
vital part of criminal enforcement."' Certainly, each UN Member
State recognized the risks of enforcing criminal law when the ICTY
and ICTR Statutes were adopted. Likewise, each state presumably
understood that arresting suspects is an inherently risky endeavor.'"
LAws COME OF AGE 278-80 (1998) (discussing the possible need for the Security
Council to pressure states that fail to cooperate with a tribunal).
151. See Annan, supra note 5, at 365 (averring that the Tribunals require the ar-
rest of all indicted persons before they can complete their task); see also Cassese,
supra note 119, at 17 (recognizing the limitation of politics in international law,
and arguing that if a state retains any important aspect of its sovereignty, thus pre-
venting the establishment of an effective enforcement mechanism for international
law, the international criminal tribunals will have a lackluster impact).
152. See MALEKIAN, supra note 109, at 56 (acknowledging that the enforcement
issue is a controversial one in international criminal law applications and princi-
ples).
153. See Brown, supra note 149, at 413-14 (asserting that the Tribunal's greatest
hindrance is its inability to execute arrest warrants); see also Sharp, supra note 39,
at 450-53 (analyzing the hesitation by nations, including the United States and
Bosnia, to arrest and surrender war criminals due to the political risk involved).
154. See Goldstone, supra note 103, at 8 ("Imagine, by analogy, the effect in
[the United States] of a statement by a police chief or an attorney general to the ef-
fect that it is not worth spilling the blood of a policeman to go and arrest a mass
rapist or serial murderer."); see also Neil J. Kritz, Accountabiliyfrr International
Crimes and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: Coming to Terms
with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of
Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 130 (1996) (emphasizing the
necessity of arresting war criminals to alleviate mental anguish of victims and pre-
vent future human rights violations).
155. See Goldstone, supra note 103, at 8 (observing that, despite the obvious
risk involved in enforcing criminal law, the United States and NATO countries
remain reluctant to place their IFOR and SFOR forces at risk); see also Sharp, su-
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To intervene against those who rape, kill, and pillage requires a stoic
character and steadfast resolve. One cannot expect those offenders
who violate the rights of others and act against the norms of civilized
society to be sensitive to the rule of law or to cooperate with policing
authorities.'5 6 The individuals targeted by the two ad hoc bodies rival
many of the world's most renowned criminals. Our passivity re-
garding enforcement ensures their continued freedom. 7
Perhaps most illustrative of the inadequacy of the current system,
however, is that fact that the majority of indictees in ICTY custody
surrendered prior to arrest.' The IFOR and SFOR forces entrusted to
facilitate arrests have not yet yielded to international shame or pres-
sure. These forces remain indignantly convinced that perilous arrests
do not constitute any component of their mission.'" "[IFOR] main-
tains that, with respect to the arrest of the indicted persons-which is
IFOR's potentially most important contribution to the Tribunal's
pra note 39, at 456 (describing the unwillingness of western countries to expose
their soldiers to the risks associated with apprehending international criminals).
156. See NATO Troops Kill Bosnian War Crimes Suspect, CNN Interactive (Jan.
9, 1999), available in <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9901/09/bosnia.ap/
index.html> (illuminating this point well is the death of one ICTY suspect, Dragan
Gagovic, who opted to try and fend off his would be captors rather than voluntarily
submit to arrest).
157. See Cassese, supra note 119, at 10 (explaining that impunity of military or
political leaders is a risk confronted when enforcement mechanisms fail). In this
circuitous manner, the failure to enforce international law, as exemplified by fail-
ing to arrest indicted defendants, secures the very impunity the tribunals were cre-
ated to avoid. See id. (reiterating that lack of enforcement results in the impunity,
which works against the concept of creating tribunals).
158. See ICTY <http://www.un.org/icty/> (indicating that 13 individuals volun-
tarily surrendered to the ICTY). In contrast, international forces arrested only II
defendants. See id. (pointing out that, of the 11 arrested, SFOR was responsible for
ten while UNTAES was responsible for 1). The ICTR, however, struggles with
similar enforcement difficulties. Recently, Ignace Bagilishema, the former Bourg-
mestre of Mabanza commune, surrendered to the ICTR after successfully taking
refuge for a period of time in South Africa. See ICTR/INFO-9-2-165 (last modified
Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc.htm> (acknowledging that, prior to
Mr. Bagilishema's surrender, arrest warrants were issued by the ICTR to Zambia,
Australia, South Africa and Singapore-all to no avail).
159. See generally Paola Gaeta, Is NATO Authorized or Obliged to Arrest Per-
sons Indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia?,
9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 174, 175 (1998) (providing a thorough analysis of whether the
IFOR and SFOR forces have the legal authority to arrest Tribunal indictees).
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work-that it 'will detain and transfer to [the Tribunal] persons in-
dicted for war crimes... when it comes into contact with such per-
sons in carrying out [its] duties. ' ''"w Implicit in this statement is an
admission or acknowledgement that IFOR will not aggressively seek
out indicted war criminals. If we are unable to rely on an interna-
tional force capable of providing police services to assist with ar-
rests, who will fulfill the mandate to bring international criminals be-
fore the tribunals? As the construction of an ICC looms dimly on the
horizon, this question of enforcement must be both addressed and
remedied.
The ICC must first remedy their lack of enforcement powers,
particularly over nations that comprise the permanent members of
the Security Council.' 62 A judicial body cannot be effective if it is
subservient to the vacillating interests of nation-states. Such subser-
vience delimits the true and illusory adjudication powers of the
court. 63 As I have continually stated, the lack of coercive power to
bring an accused before the court emasculates the legal character of
160. Drazen Petrovic, The Post-Dayton Role of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in POST-WAR PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 209 (Michael O'Flaherty & Gregory Gisvold eds.,
1998) (citing NATO Press Release (96)26 (Feb. 14, 1996), available in
<http://wwv.nato.int/docu/pr/ 1996/>).
161. See Pejic, supra note 148, at 854 (observing that -[g]iven that states have
so far failed to meaningfully assist the Tribunal, despite its mandatory character
and potential Security Council backing, there is an even greater possibility that
they will be slack in cooperating with the ICC."): see also MERON, supra note 150,
at 285 (warning that international criminal tribunals require police power to dis-
tribute justice effectively and asserting that the lack of such power endangers the
very effort of creating an international criminal lav regime); Brown, supra note
149, at 409-10 (postulating that the failure to bring indicted criminals to justice
will undermine the tribunal's credibility); Sadat Wexler, supra note 118, at 714-15
(suggesting that the tribunal will be ineffective in deterring international crime
without support from the states).
162. See MALEKIAN, supra note 109, at 51 (projecting that, so long as particular
members of the Security Council retain their permanent seats thus controlling en-
forceability of international criminal law, the elements constituting an international
crime will likewise remain in controversy).
163. See id. at 70 (arguing that the lack of prosecutions for war crimes commit-
ted during the Vietnam War aptly demonstrates the monopolistic nature of interna-
tional criminal law). Though the post-Nuremberg proceedings evince that war
crimes and crimes against humanity are not subject to any statute of limitations,
there is a conspicuous absence of war crimes trials against American servicemen.
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an international criminal body. Merely branding an individual as an
"international fugitive" is adding little to the success of either Tribu-
nal. l6 As the current situation indicates, international criminal law
cannot depend on the acquiescence of powerful nations. Otherwise,
international tribunals return to the setting of "victors' justice,"
which begs the question whether international criminal law is capa-
ble of equitable distribution. Without salient enforcement, interna-
tional criminal law provides only the enticing mirage of justice.
B. CONVICTIONS AND ONGOING TRIALS
[T]he principal problem with the enforcement of international humanitar-
ian law through the prosecution and punishment of individuals is that the
implementation of this method ultimately hinges on, and depends upon,
the goodwill of states.16 -
One cannot deny the fact that progress at the Tribunals, as meas-
ured by convictions, has been limited severely. The case of Drazen
Erdemovic at The Hague is the only final judgment'66 issued by either
the ICTY or the ICTR in their more than eleven combined years of
164. But see Hildreth, supra note 131, at 515 (noting the heightened ability of
the Court to apply pressure in the capture of fugitive suspects through the assign-
ment of "international fugitive" status); but see also MERON, supra note 150, at
283 (admonishing that "those indicted by the tribunal are now branded with a mark
of Cain that serves as some measure of retribution, preventing them from traveling
abroad and instilling in them the fear of arrest by an adversary or foreign govern-
ment."); Peter Rosenblum, Save the Tribunals; Salvage the Movement, A Response
to Makau Mutua, I 1 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 189, 194 (1997) (averring that
since international fugitives effectively become social outcasts, there is an in-
creased chance that they eventually may be prosecuted).
165. Cassese, supra note 119, at 4.
166. The Hague and Arusha Tribunals both have a limited number of convic-
tions pending on appeal. Currently, six defendants are appealing convictions before
the ICTY, while the prosecutor is appealing the sole acquittal rendered. See ICTY
(last visited Dec. 20, 1999) <http://www.un.org/icty/>. A seventh defendant was
recently convicted. It is uncertain at this point whether this most recent conviction
and sentence against Goran Jelisic will be unchallenged on appeal. His sentence of
forty years, however, is the harshest sentence to date and signifies the first break
with domestic sentencing practices. See Press Release 454-e (Dec. 14, 1999)
available at <http://www.un.org/icty>. Similarly, all five defendants convicted by
the ICTR are exercising their appellate rights. See ICTR (last visited Dec. 20,
1999) <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/factsheets/factsee.htm>.
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operation."" On March 5, 1998, the ICTY sentenced Mr. Erdemovic
to five years in prison after pleading guilty to murdering between
seventy and one hundred unarmed Muslims in a mass execution.'
Unlike the Nuremberg proceedings that began with those most re-
sponsible for the design and implementation of Hitler's "Final Solu-
tion," the two ad hoc Tribunals instituted their prosecutions based on
their restricted ability to arrest and detain various suspects.'" In con-
trast to the Nuremberg, Tokyo, and the Control Council Law No. 10
proceedings where there was a clear delineation between the upper
echelon defendants who were responsible for the planning, organiza-
167. Interestingly, the case of Mr. Erdemovic has gained very little attention.
Instead, most scholars and observers have focused on the trial of Dusko Tadic. See,
e.g., SCHARF, supra note 5, at 93-226 (providing a thorough review of Dusko Ta-
dic's trial). Mr. Scharf observed that "historians are likely to rank the trial of
Dusko Tadic among the most important trials of the century ... [Tihe importance
of the Tadic case lies not in the status of the defendant or even the nature of his al-
leged crimes, but in the fact that the proceedings constituted an historic turning
point for the world community." Id. at 214. This inattention regarding Erdemovic
may be based on the fact that Erdemovic pled guilty and, thus, did not test the trial
capacities of the ICTY. See id. at 133. The omission may also be due to the fact
that Erdemovic truly is one of the smaller players in a grand scheme of ethnic
cleansing. But see id. at 222 (observing that Tadic stood trial for the murder of 13
people and the torture of 19 more). Based on sheer numbers, Erdemovic killed six
to eight times as many individuals as Tadic. See id. at 133 (noting Erdemovic was
charged with the murders of up to 100 civilians). The failure to cite Erdemovic and
his "minimal" prosecution-particularly in light of the negligible five-year sen-
tence that was issued---certainly does not add credibility and prestige to the pur-
suits at The Hague.
168. See UN War Crimes Court Hands Down First Sentence, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESS, Nov. 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12190835 (reporting that
Erdemovic was the first international suspect to plead guilty before a trial and be
sentenced by the Tribunal); see also Balkans War Criminal Jailed, INDEP.
(LONDON), Nov. 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13510171 (reporting that Erde-
movic is the first individual to be sentenced by an international war crimes Tribu-
nal since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials). The original sentence handed down by
the Trial Chamber was 10 years imprisonment. Following a successful appeal and
remand to a second, different Trial Chamber, Mr. Erdemovic was sentenced to
serve only five years in prison. See "Honest" Bosnian Killer Has Sentence Cut
from 10 to Five Years, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Mar. 5, 1998, available in 1998
WL 2235479 (reporting that Erdemovic's sentence was reduced based, in part, on
his cooperation and forthrightness with the court).
169. See SCHARF, supra note 5, at 222-23 (stating that numerous critics distin-
guished the ICTY's first few trials from Nuremberg, where the key architects of
the Holocaust were tried).
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tion, and incitement of the mass-killings and the "lesser" criminals,
there is no apparent, or structured, hierarchy of defendants at either
Tribunal. Rather, the Tribunals must rely on the fortuity of case de-
velopments based upon sporadic arrests, 7' infrequent surrenders,'7'
and subservient political factors. 
7
In many regards, the inaugural case of Drazen Erdemovic signifies
the impotence of the ad hoc Tribunals. There is no denying that Mr.
Erdemovic is one of the "lesser" criminals involved in the ethnic
cleansing of the Former Yugoslavia. While the gravity of his acts in
killing numerous unarmed Muslims cannot be overemphasized, nei-
ther can the world ignore that his conviction adds very little to the
170. See Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96
MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2079-80 (1998) (commenting on the difficulties of preventing
future human rights violations due to the large number of suspected criminals and
the hesitancies within the international community).
171. Recently, the ICTR realized the fortuitous nature of surrenders when Omar
Serushago surrendered to the Tribunal prior to any indictment being issued for his
arrest. See infra text accompanying note 181.
172. See SCHARF, supra note 5, at 223 (referring to the Prosecutor's wish of be-
ginning the ICTY proceedings with a higher-profile defendant, which was denied
due to political considerations). When asked whether the Tadic case was a good
one with which to begin, Richard Goldstone replied,
If one had a choice, clearly not. Instead one would have wanted to start with a
higher profile defendant. It is highly unsatisfactory that someone at the level
of Dusko Tadic should face trial and that those who incited and facilitated his
conduct should escape justice and remain unaccountable. But it's really an
academic question because we had no choice; Tadic was the only accused
available to bring before the Tribunal at a time when the judges, the media,
and the international community were clamoring for us to begin prosecutions.
See id. (citing Interview with Justice Richard Goldstone, Brussels, Belgium (July
20, 1996)). This statement is indicative of the political and logistical constraints
confronting both Tribunals. Id. The international community "clamored" for the
creation of ad hoc Tribunals at a time when the target countries, the Former Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda, were not ready to receive them. The impotence of the UN and
the world community in forcing compliance with the Tribunals is also portrayed
through such prosecutorial barriers. Recently, the new Chief Prosecutor, Louise
Arbour, was denied access to Kosovo after another ethnic massacre. Ms. Arbour
was accordingly unable to obtain fresh evidence from the village and crime site
and was required to wait for permission to enter the crime scene. Such limitations
present huge obstacles in the administration of a criminal Tribunal. Unlike Nurem-
berg where the Allied Forces maintained control over Germany, no one seems to
have control over the situations still plaguing the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
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restoration of peace in the Balkan region. After Mr. Erdemovic ad-
mitted to massacring between seventy and one hundred individuals,
he was sentenced to a mere five years in a Norwegian prison."" This
paltry sentence underscores the difficulty in bringing war criminals
to justice."
173. Only four states thus far agreed to accept ICTY prisoners upon final con-
viction and signed agreements to this effect. These states are Italy, Finland, Nor-
way, and Sweden. See ICTY Press Release: Sweden to Become Fourth State to
Sign an Agreement on the Enforcement of Sentences (Feb. 18, 1999)
<http://wvv.un.org/icty/pressreal/p382-e.htm>. Six others states indicated their
"willingness" to enforce ICTY sentences. These states include Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and
Sweden. See Report on the International Tribunal for the Prosecution oj Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. ICTY, 52d Sess.,
Agenda Item 49, para. 152, U.N. Doc. S/1997/729 (1997) [hereinafter ICTY Re-
port]. In addition to those offering support, ten other states indicated that they are
unable to accept ICTY prisoners. The unavailable states are the Bahamas, Belarus,
Belize, Burkina-Faso, Ecuador, France, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Poland and Slo-
venia. See id. para. 155.
174. The ICTY Trial Chambers consistently made contradictory statements re-
garding sentencing. The Trial Chamber, responsible for sentencing Erdemovic
following appeal, noted that the "degree of suffering to which the victims of the
massacre were subjected before and during the killings," particularly i[the atmos-
phere of terror and violence" that pervaded these events. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,Sentencing Judgement, IT-96-22, para. 20, I.L.R. (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Yugo.
1998) <http://www.un.org/icty>. The Trial Chamber continued that
[f]or the victims who arrived after the first set of killings, there was the cer-
tain knowledge of death, as they will have seen the bodies of those already
murdered and heard the gunshots fired by the accused and his fellow execu-
tioners. The degree of suffering of these people cannot be overlooked.
Id. Yet, in pronouncing the lenient sentence of five years of imprisonment, the
Trial Chamber focused on Mr. Erdemovic's hesitance to partake in the killings and
his reaction to having carried out such heinous tasks. See id. ("It is clear that he
took no perverse pleasure from what he did."). Likewise, the rhetoric contained in
the Furundzija Judgement suggests a strange dichotomy between outrage and reti-
cence. The Furundzija Trial Chamber stated, in relation to the allegations of tor-
ture, that "[t]orture is one of the most serious offenses know to international crimi-
nal law and any sentence imposed must take this into account." Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, IT-95-17/1, para. 281, _I.L.R._ (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Yugo. 1998)
<http://vww.un.org/icty>. The Trial Chamber further noted that Mr. Furundzija
played a prominent role in the commission of many particularly gruesome rapes.
See id. paras. 282-283 (finding that the rapes in this case were vicious and included
torture of the victims). "Apart from the factors mentioned above, the Trial Cham-
ber bears in mind the severe physical pain and great emotional trauma that [the
7
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Six of these sentences and the sole acquittal achieved at The
Hague are currently on appeal. Thus, in nearly six full years of op-
eration, ' the ICTY has completed only six trials involving nine
separate defendants, including Mr. Erdemovic's guilty plea. This
pace is counterproductive to accountability goals, which often focus
on the swiftness and certainty of punishment.176
The situation in Arusha is equally challenged by indolence. During
its first two years of existence, the ICTR was publicly admonished
by the UN for its administrative failings and inability to conduct
business.' 7 Once the ICTR rectified its situation, there was renewed
victim] has had to suffer as a consequence of these depraved acts committed
against her." Id. para. 287. Despite the potency of this language, the Trial Chamber
sentenced Mr. Furundzjia to ten years of imprisonment for the acts of torture and
eight years of imprisonment for the outrages upon personal dignity, including rape.
Id. at pt. IX. Further contrary to the strong language condemning the attack and the
reflection upon the mandate of the ICTY to contribute to reconciliation, deterrence,
and the combat of impunity, the Tribunal opted that the sentences be served con-
currently. Id. Although there is no requirement that sentences be served either con-
secutively or concurrently, the ICTY ruled, in each of the sentences pronounced to
date, that the sentences be served concurrently. This determination undoubtedly is
due to the domestic sentencing practices of the Former Yugoslavia, which require
concurrent sentences. Id. para. 293.
175. See SCHARF, supra note 5, at 63-66 (indicating that six months expired be-
fore the Judges were empanelled in November, 1993). Thereafter, the Judges were
faced with the onerous task of creating rules of procedure and evidence controlling
Tribunal proceedings, an endeavor that spanned an additional two months. Id. at
66-73. To exacerbate matters, the selection of an acceptable Prosecutor took even
longer. For various political reasons, Richard Goldstone was not selected to begin
the Tribunal's prosecutorial work until July 7, 1994. Id. at 75-79. Without judges
or a Prosecutor to issue indictments, the Tribunal was unable to perform any
criminal justice functions prior to late 1994. Id.
176. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century, in I TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 65 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (comparing the suc-
cess of the Greek transition period from military to democratic regimes and subse-
quent trials with the Argentinean experience). Professor Huntington noted that the
important distinction between Greece and Argentina was that Karamanlis, of
Greece, moved quickly with prosecutions when he had a high amount of public
support while Alfosin, of Argentina, moved more slowly, thereby permitting
"public outrage and support for prosecution [to give] way to indifference .. " Id.
at 74-75.
177. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE, supra note 85, at pt. VI (describing the serious
management and administrative problems hindering early success at the ICTR).
This report confirms that the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services issued a
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hope regarding possible contributions to peace and healing in
Rwanda.17 ' To date, however, the ICTR has handed down only five
sentences, all of which remain pending on appeal. The first sentence
was issued in Prosecutor v. Akayesu' 79 on September 2, 1998, more
than four full years after the creation of the Tribunal. One month
later, on October 2, 1998, the ICTR handed down its second sentence
following a guilty plea from Jean Kambanda, the former Prime Min-
ister of the Interim Government of Rwanda.' Three additional de-
fendants, Omar Serushago, Clement Kayishema, and Obed Ruzin-
dana, have been condemned by the ICTR for their respective roles in
the Rwandan genocide.'
8
'
Contrary to the more lenient sentences imposed at the ICTY, three
of the first five convictions rendered at the ICTR have resulted in life
sentences for the respective defendants. '" The two remaining sen-
tences, however, are more consistent with those administered at The
Hague and demonstrate the commitment of the ICTR to consider the
ends ofjustice and individual situations in declaring sentences.
Despite these sparse and intermittent convictions, neither institu-
tion really has established itself as a body capable of rendering jus-
tice while simultaneously securing peace and reconciliation in war-
scathing report detailing gross mismanagement at the ICTR on Feb. 12, 1997. Id.
As a result of the UN Report, the UN Secretary-General asked for and received the
resignation of both the ICTR registrar and deputy prosecutor. Id.
178. See id.
179. Sentencing Judgment, ICTR-96-4-T, _I.L.R._ (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
Rwanda 1998) <http://vww.ictr.org>.
180. Sentencing Judgment, ICTR-97-23-S, -I.L.R._ (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
Rwanda 1998) <http://www.ictr.org>.
181. Sentencing Judgment, ICTR 98-39-S, para. 1, I.L.R.. (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda 1999) <http://vww.ictr.org>. An interesting side-note to the
prosecution/conviction of Mr. Serushago is that he surrendered to the Tribunal.
Thus, the ICTR did not have to wait for his arrest to begin proceedings. In fact, Mr.
Serushago was not even indicted prior to his voluntary surrender. See Prosecutor v.
Serushago, para. 34. His actions most likely exemplify the concerns that Rwandan
officials had-defendants will prefer the option of a prison sentence as opposed to
death penalty exposure. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92. For information
regarding the two remaining defendants see generally <http://www.ictr.org> (last
visited Dec. 20, 1999)
182. See infra text accompanying notes 206-210. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Jean
Kambunda, and Clement Kayishema have each received life sentences. See
<http://www.ictr.org> (last visited Dec. 20, 1999).
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torn countries. The laborious nature of the proceedings and the thor-
ough attempt to create fair rules of procedure and evidence have
crippled the Tribunals. The Nuremberg proceedings took one year to
complete from start to finish. '83 Similarly, the Tokyo trials lasted only
two and one half years and resulted in determinations of guilt for
each of the indicted individuals. 8 4 Thus, the justice delivered at Nur-
emberg and Tokyo was swift, sure and expedient. The World War II
Tribunals marked a conclusion to the war, but did not unnecessarily
belabor the process so as to cause the interest in their endeavors to
wane.
In recognition of the logistical problems faced by both the ICTY
and ICTR, the Security Council recently amended the Tribunal Stat-
utes to incorporate a third Trial Chamber at both The Hague and
Arusha. Despite the obvious deficiencies encountered at both venues,
the Security Council reiterated its conviction that "the prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of international humani-
tarian law will contribute to the process of national reconciliation and
to the restoration and maintenance of peace in Rwanda" '" and Yugo-
slavia. 16 This steadfast commitment is necessary if these bodies are
to lay a solid foundation for the ICC and contribute any discemable
precedent to international criminal law.
It seems unfair at this point to evaluate the Tribunals based solely
183. See SCHARF, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that the Nuremberg trial of 22
German officials lasted 284 days).
184. See ASKIN, supra note 35, at 167-70 (observing that all of the Tokyo Trial
defendants were adjudged of at least one charge). This figure regarding conviction
ratio deals only with the "A" category defendants, which are defendants charged
with crimes against peace. See id. at nn.558, 559.
185. See S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doe S/RES/ 1I65 (1998)
(indicating that Resolution 1165 was adopted by the Security Council at its 3877th
meeting on April 30, 1998).
186. See S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc S/RES/I 166 (1998)
(indicating that Resolution 1166 was adopted by the Security Council at its 3878th
meeting on May 13, 1998). The language contained in Resolution 1166 mirrors
that set forth in Resolution 1165 regarding Rwanda. The Security Council stated as
follows: "Remaining convinced that the prosecution of persons responsible for se-
rious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia contributes to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the
former Yugoslavia .... Decides to establish a Third Chamber of the International
Tribunal." Id.
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on their tangible work product. Unlike their predecessor at Nurem-
berg, both the ICTY and ICTR must struggle to achieve justice in
distant locations where access to witnesses, evidence, and defendants
is limited. The lack of convictions and ongoing trial progress may
not be as relevant as the decisions that have been rendered. Accord-
ingly, Part IV of this Article is devoted to analyzing the judgments
and sentences issued by the respective Tribunals.
III. SENTENCING AND DETENTION: THE NEED
FOR UNIFORMITY
It is much easier to show that punishment has a symbolic significance
than to state exactly what it is that punishment expresses.
Following the Nuremberg judgments, eleven men were con-
denned to death by hanging."" In this ironic manner-through the
imposition of the death penalty-the international community con-
firmed that killing was wrong. Surprisingly, the defendants' main
objection to their sentences was not that they resulted in death."'
Rather, the Nuremberg defendants opposed imposition of a penalty,
death by hanging, which was reserved for common criminals." In
187. Feinberg, supra note 115, at 76.
188. See TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 598-99. A twelfth defendant, Martin Bor-
mann, was tried in abstentia, found guilty and likewise sentenced to death. See
MICHAEL R. MARRUs, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMNEs TRIAL 1945-1946: A
DOCUMENT HISTORY 261 (1997). But, as Mr. Bormann was never captured by the
Tribunal, he avoided the fate suffered by his compatriots. Id. In all, 19 men were
convicted at Nuremberg. See ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG 497-507
(1983) (noting that three defendants were acquitted of all charges and eventually
released). The Tokyo defendants fared no better. Of the 25 men convicted by the
Tokyo Tribunal, seven received the death penalty. See MINEAR, supra note 67, at
31 (suggesting that the Tokyo indictment was more Draconian than the Nuremberg
judgment).
189. From a strictly logical perspective, the imposition of a penalty of death to
illustrate that death (through killing) is wrong is indefensible and absurd. The mo-
rality of killing is no more justifiable in punishment than in the proscribed com-
mission of a crime. Nonetheless, this argument did not arise at Nuremberg.
190. See TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 601-02 (observing on appeal that the defen-
dants attempted to commute the sentences to life imprisonment or the method of
execution). Ironically, the main complaint by defendants focused on the use of
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fact, one of the defendants so opposed the method of execution that
he opted for suicide rather than submit to the gallows.9'
Much has changed in the world since the days of Nuremberg. Of
particular significance from a human rights perspective is the grow-ing oncen rgardng " .. 192
ing concern regarding impunity. In paradoxical fashion, the human
rights community increasingly is supporting the need for punish-
ment.' 93 While once this field was dominated by a concern for the
rights and the treatment of prisoners, 9 4 human rights lawyers rapidly
hanging as the instrumentality of death. See id. (pointing out that the Nuremberg
defendants challenged their death-by-hanging sentence on the rationale that a sol-
dier was entitled to the more honorable death by firing squad). This delineation
between an "honorable death" by firing squad and the less favored method of
hanging did not go unnoticed by the Nuremberg judges. See PERSICO, supra note
26, at 385 (observing that Judge Henri Donnedieu de Vabres considered utilizing
the firing squad for each of the military defendants adjudged guilty, and noting that
Russian Judge Nikitchenko objected to use of firing squads precisely because
"[t]he bullet was the fate of honorable adversaries, not of butchers.").
191. See CONOT, supra note 188, at 504 (describing the successful suicide at-
tempt by famed defendant, Hermann Goering, who managed to keep hidden within
his cell a single cyanide capsule in case he was convicted). In fact, Mr. Goering
purportedly left a suicide note voicing his objection to the method of death. See
PERSICO, supra note 26, at 418 (reflecting on Goering's conviction that he should
die an honorable death). Goering's letter reads as follows:
To the Allied Control Council:
I would have had no objection to being shot. However, I will not facilitate
execution of Germany's Reichsmarschall by hanging! For the sake of Ger-
many, I cannot permit this. Moreover, I feel no moral obligation to submit to
my enemies' punishment. For this reason, I have chosen to die like the great
Hannibal.
Id.
192. See Neier, supra note 48, at 172 (observing a progression by democratic
governments in transition for demanding accountability for past repression).
193. See id. (describing efforts by nations undergoing transitions to democracy
on dealing with past repression and abuses and demanding accountability); see
also Human Rights Watch, Policy Statement on Accountability for Past Abuses, in
1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER
REGIMES 217 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (advocating for "criminal prosecutions and
punishment for those who have the highest degree of responsibility for the most
severe abuses of human rights" while recognizing that "accountability may be
achieved by public disclosure and condemnation in cases of lesser responsibility
and/or less severe abuses.").
194. The most notable change in position may well be that expressed by Am-
nesty International, which took a position against amnesties. See Amnesty Interna-
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are becoming the instigators in the international community's desire
to punish.' The ambivalent lack of action demonstrated throughout
the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s culminated in a culture of punishment.
Amnesties are considered inadequate as victims and humanitarians
contend that impunity must not prevail. ' " Punishment, via criminal
prosecutions, is perceived as the most favored method of combating
impunity. 197 Thus enters the ICC.
As human rights lawyers, however, we must not lose sight of our
moral compass in our zeal to further protect human rights.' 5 For even
those least deserving of our sympathy or justice will ultimately hold
us accountable for the methodology we employ against them. We
cannot ourselves avoid the very moral mandates we profess. If the
achievement and advancement of human rights remains the goal,
human rights lawyers somehow must maintain a just disposition to-
ward those who come before the heralded criminal process. The ICC
must deliver justice, not only for the victims, but also for the victim-
izers. Only through the consistent application of human rights norms
will the international community ensure that humanitarian principles
succeed and, eventually, triumph.
tional, Policy Statement on Inipunity, in I TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HoW EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 219 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995)
("[T]hose responsible for human rights violations must be brought to justice
whether they are officials of a past or current government and regardless of
whether they are members of the security forces or unofficial paramilitary groups.
Alleged perpetrators should be brought to trial and such trials should conclude with
a clear verdict of guilt or innocence.").
195. See William A. Schabas, Sentencing B' International Tribunals: A Human
Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 461, 501 (1997) (warning that a
human rights approach to punishment must avoid the growing tendency toward re-
tributive justice).
196. See Elie Wiesel, in NUREMBERG FORTY YEARS LATER: THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST INJUSTICE IN OUR TIME 11, 15, 20 (Irwin Colter ed., 1995) ("Neutrality is
wrong. When human beings are in danger, when human dignity is at stake, neu-
trality is a sin, not a virtue. For neutrality never helps the victim, it only helps the
victimizer, it never assists the tormented, it only encourages the tormentor.").
197. See id. at 20 (reflecting on the feeling that justice was served by allowing
witnesses to testify about their memories of Nuremberg).
198. Benjamin Franklin once cautioned that "necessity makes a bad bargain."
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A. SENTENCING TIED TO DOMESTIC SENTENCING PRACTICES
The creation of an international criminal court is a unique opportunity to
advance justice, prevent future acts of cruelty, and promote peace. The
establishment of fair and consistent international criminal sentencing
guidelines will be a significant contribution to these worthy goals. "
One of the main distinctions (and moral improvements) between
the ICTY, the ICTR and the World War II Tribunals is that the mod-
em ad hoc Tribunals prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.2"'
This proscription fully comports with the growing consensus that the
death penalty itself constitutes a violation of human rights.' Thus,
the Statutes adopted by the Security Council limit the penalties im-
posed by the Tribunals to imprisonment.0 2 Both systems envisioned
that their respective Tribunal "shall have recourse to the general
practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda 2 °3 or the
199. Daniel B. Pickard, Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for the International
Criminal Court, 20 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123, 164 (1997) (offering one of
the few published viewpoints on sentencing and international criminal law).
200. The death penalty was a regularly exercised option both at Nuremberg and
Tokyo. See MINEAR, supra note 67, at 31-32 & n.24 (observing that seven of the
original Tokyo defendants received the death penalty). Likewise, II defendants at
Nuremberg were hung by the Allied forces as punishment for the egregious crimes
they committed. See TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 598-99.
201. WALLACE A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-21, 285-89 (1993) (recognizing the progression in inter-
national norms on limiting the use of the death penalty, such as setting higher stan-
dards on procedural requirements whereby, the death penalty may be imposed by
law).
202. See ICTR Statute, supra note 83, art. 23 (restricting sentences by the ICTR
to life imprisonment); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Sentencing Judgment, ICTR-97-
23-S, para. 10, _I.L.R._ (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 1998) <http://
www.ictr.org> (interpreting this limitation regarding imprisonment to likewise re-
strict other forms of punishment, such as penal servitude or fines); see also ICTY
Statute, supra note 61, art. 24 (limiting sentences imposed by the ICTY to life im-
prisonment).
203. See ICTR Statute, supra note 83, art. 23 (providing, in pertinent part, that
"[t]he penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In
determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chamber shall have recourse to
the general practices regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda."), quoted
in Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Sentencing Judgment, ICTR 97-23-S, para. 9,
_I.L.R._ (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 1998) (emphasis added)
<http://www.ictr.org>. Although no specific term of imprisonment is noted in ei-
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Former Yugoslavia. 20"
These provisions, which tie sentencing practices to domestic sen-
tencing patterns, are terribly disconcerting. How can an international
criminal body attach its penalty scheme to variant domestic jurisdic-
tions? To do so undermines the true "international" character of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, this concession
underscores the sacrifice necessary to ensure political support and
the political will of international participants. The Rome Statute,
fortunately, distances the ICC from sentencing procedures based
primarily on domestic schemes.20. The danger resulting from a do-
ther Tribunal Statute, each of the Tribunals proscribed the outer parameter of life
imprisonment in each of their respective Rules of Procedure and Evidence. See
INT'L CRiM. TRIB. FOR RVANDA R. 101 <http://vww.un.org/ictr/rules.html>
(specifying that "[a] person convicted by the Tribunal may be sentenced to impris-
onment for a term up to and including the remainder of his life."). Furthermore, in
determining the sentence under Rule 101, the Tribunal shall take into account the
customary practice of Rwanda regarding prison sentences. See id. (requiring the
ICTR to account for Rwanda's general practices when handing down prison sen-
tences); see also Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, para. 41 (interpreting the intent of
Rule 101 as to act as a guide for Tribunal judges to utilize in determining the ap-
propriate sentences).
204. See ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 24 (providing, in nearly identical
fashion to the ICTR's Article 23, Article 24 of the ICTY statute, in pertinent part,
requires that "[t]he penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to im-
prisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall
have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the
former Yugoslavia."), quoted in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic. Sentencing Judgment,
IT-96-22, para. 12, ___I.L.R._ (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Yugo. 1998) (emphasis
added) <http://ww-v.un.org/icty>. Much like the ICTR, the ICTY further delineates
the parameters of imprisonment in Rule 101 of its Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence by permitting imprisonment up to and including life. See Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. IT/32 Rev. 6 (6 Oct. 1995)
[hereinafter ICTY Rules] (accounting for the customary sentencing practice of the
Former Yugoslavia as delineated in Rule 101(A)).
205. See Rome Statute, supra note 117, art. 77 (providing, in pertinent part, that
a convicted individual will be subject to "[i]mprisonment for a specified number of
years, which may not exceed a maximum of 30 years; or... [a] term of life im-
prisonment justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circum-
stance of the convicted person."). In this regard, there is less likelihood that we
will witness discrepancy in sentencing between similarly situated individuals who
commit similar crimes in distinct locations. Fortunately, the venue of the crime be-
comes less relevant for sentencing purposes under the ICC provisions.
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mestic-model sentencing formula is illustrated by the limited judg-
ments issued at the two modem Tribunals.
Although both Tribunals profess their ability to override this link,
the transparency of the fixation to domestic practices is aptly demon-
strated in the decisions rendered. The ICTY, in its most thorough
sentencing decision to date, considered the inconsistency confronted
by Rule 101(A) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
which permit sentences allowing life imprisonment, with the sen-
tencing practices in the Former Social Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via ("SFRY"), which prohibit any penalty in excess of twenty years
for a capital offense and fifteen years for a non-capital offense.206 The
Trial Chamber found that the regional limitations regarding punish-
ment did not preclude the ICTY from imposing a life sentence if
warranted.2 7 Interestingly, however, the ICTY has not yet found suf-
ficient cause to deviate from the SFRY sentencing scheme. The
ICTY has subjected each defendant to precisely the same penalty
scheme that otherwise would have been encountered in the domestic
setting. Not a single defendant who was ineligible for a minimum
term under SFRY principles was given a sentence exceeding twenty
years.' °8 Furthermore, no defendant who was subject to a minimum
term under SFRY principles was sentenced below that minimum. '
206. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Sentencing Judgment, IT-96-21-T, para. 1193,
_I.L.R._ (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Yugo. 1998) <http://www.un.org/icty> (under-
standing the general practice regarding sentences in the courts of the Former
Yugoslavia as a guide for the Trial Chamber in determining sentences in cases be-
fore the ICTY).
207. See id. paras. 1193-1196 (concluding that in each ICTY case the Tribunal
consulted, the practices of the domestic courts in determining the appropriate sen-
tences).
208. See infra note 210 and accompanying text (illustrating the sentences that
convicted criminals received from the ICTY). But see <http://www.un.org/icty>
for information regarding the recent conviction and sentence of Goran Jelisic. Mr.
Jelisic, though acquitted on charges of genocide, received the harshest sentence to
date-forty years. Because this conviction is not yet final, it remains to be seen
whether the ICTY will actually veer from the domestic sentencing practices and
uphold this sentence.
209. Two defendants, Dusko Tadic and Hazim Delalic, both received the SFRY
maximum penalty of 20 years. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 112 I.L.R. 286, 314-15
(Int'l Crim. Trib. For Yugo. 1998) (Sentencing Judgment) (holding that each of the
sentences will be served concurrently); see also Delalic, IT-96-2 1 -T, para. 1286
(agreeing with the Tadic court that the sentences would be served concurrently in-
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Regardless of strong language, which indicates that the ICTY has the
authority to announce any sentence, there is not yet any observable
departure from the SFRY domestic model. -'
Accordingly, there is an appreciable disparity between the sen-
tences pronounced by the ICTY and those handed down at the ICTR.
The longest sentences the ICTY issued occurred in the judgments
against Dusko Tadic and Hazim Delalic, each of whom was sen-
tenced to twenty years.21' By comparison, the ICTR imposed life
stead of consecutively). Tadic's sentence has recently been increased on appeal,
however, to twenty-five years. It is uncertain at this point whether Tadic will chal-
lenge the increase-or be permitted to do so---on appeal. Esad Landzo received a
sentence of 15 years. See Delalic, IT-96-21-T at para. 1285 (noting Landzo's sen-
tence). Anto Furundzija received a sentence of ten years. See Prosecutor v. Fu-
rundzjia, Sentencing Judgment, IT-95-17/I-T-10, sec. IX (Int'l. Crim. Trib. For
Yugo. 1998) <http://wxv.un.org.icty> (noting Furundzjia's sentence). See Delalic,
IT-96-21-T, para. 1285 (noting Mucic's sentence). Finally, Drazen Erdemovic re-
ceived an initial sentence of ten years, which was reduced following appeal to five
years. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, IT96-22, paras. 6, 23,
_J.L.1_ (Int'l Crim. Trib. For Yugo. 1998) <http://,vw.un.org/icty> (noting
Erdemovic's sentence). The most recent judgment against Zlatko Aleksovski, is-
sued by the Tribunal on May 7, 1999, marked the lightest sentence thus far. Mr.
Aleksovski was ordered to serve two and one half years in prison for violations of
the laws and customs of war. See ICTY Press Release, Aleksovi Case: The Judg-
ment of the Trial Chamber (last modified May 7, 1999) <http://www.un.org/icty>
(crediting Aleksovki for time served and thereby ordering his immediate release).
210. But see supra note 208 (considering the possibility that the forty-year sen-
tence pronounced against Goran Jelisic may provide the first case departing from
this practice). In addition to the deference afforded time-based penalties, the ICTY
likewise has afforded great weight to the SFRY principles regarding concurrent
versus consecutive sentencing. See Furundzija IT-95-17/I-T, paras. 292-96 (hold-
ing that, in cases of multiple convictions for offenses committed by several acts
stemming from the same event, the sentence is limited to punishment only for the
most serious offense). The Court, while proclaiming judicial independence, has yet
to veer far from the SFRY policies regarding concurrent sentences. See, e.g., id.
(demonstrating the ICTY's use of allowing convicted defendants to serve their
sentences concurrently). Each of the defendants convicted of more than one of-
fense before the ICTY received concurrent sentences-all remaining at or below
the maximum penalty permissible under the SFRY domestic model. See supra note
209 and accompanying text (discussing the preference of the ICTY to allow those
convicted by the Tribunal to serve concurrent sentences). This recalcitrance to en-
act stiff penalties becomes troublesome when compared with the sentencing prac-
tices utilized in Arusha. See infra notes 212-216 and accompanying text (analyzing
the stiff penalty structure utilized by the ICTR).
211. See supra note 209 (reporting the sentences that Dusko Tadic and Hazim
Delalic received). But see <http://,vwv.un.org> (last visited Dec. 20, 1999) (indi-
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sentences on three of the initial five defendants who were con-
. • 212
victed. These results similarly are based on the connection between
ICTR defendants and domestic sentencing practices. Relying on
Rwanda Organic Law No. 8/96,23 which was adopted two years after
the genocide, the ICTR categorized each of its three convicted de-
fendants as either Category 1 or Category 2 defendants.
1 4
cating that the first appeal heard regarding Dusko Tadic resulted in an increase of
his sentence from twenty to twenty-five years)
212. See <http://ictr.org> (last visited Dec. 20, 1999) (setting forth the sentences
received by the ICTR defendants as follows: Jean-Paul Akayesu (life); Jean Kam-
banda (life); Clement Kayishema (life); Obed Ruzindana (twenty-five years); and
Omar Serushago (fifteen years).
213. See Rwandan Organic Law No. 8/96 (1996), cited in Prosecutor v. Kam-
banda, ICTR-97-23-I, para. 18, _I.L.R._ (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 1998)
<http://www.ictr.org>. Adopted by Rwanda in 1996, the Rwandan Organic Law on
the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses constituting the Crime of Genocide
or Crimes against Humanity contains four (4) distinct categories of offenders. The
four (4) categories can be summarized as follows:
Category 1
a) Persons whose criminal acts or those whose acts place them among plan-
ners, organizers, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or a crime
against humanity;
b) Persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, prefectural,
communal, sector or cell, or in a political party, the army, religious organiza-
tions, or militia and who perpetrated or fostered such crimes;
c) Notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with
which they committed atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of
residence or where they passed; and,
d) Persons who committed acts of sexual violence.
Category 2
Persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place
them among perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices of intentional homicide
or of serious assault against the person causing death.
Category 3
Persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make
them guilty of other serious assaults against the person.
Category 4
Persons who committed offenses against property.
See id. (setting forth the categorical breakdown of offenders under Rwandan law).
214. See Kambanda, ICTR-97-23-I, para. 19 (finding Kambanda as a Category I
defendant); see also Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T at paras. 46-49 (characterizing Akay-
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The main distinction, in Rwanda, between Category 1 and Cate-
gory 2 defendants is that persons falling under Category 1, if con-
victed, receive a mandatory death sentence." These defendants can-
not even benefit in sentencing by pleading guilty. :2b Accordingly,
Jean Kambanda, the Prime Minister of the Interim Government dur-
ing the genocidal campaign, received a life sentence after pleading
guilty to a six-count indictment, which included claims of genocide
and crimes against humanity."" The ICTR showed no amount of le-
niency or mercy in the life sentence rendered against Kambanda,
who, domestically, would have been considered a Category 1 defen-
dant and sentenced to death. Rather, the decision closes with the dis-
comforting admission that the ICTR noted "the general practice of
sentencing by the Courts of Rwanda"2" to reach its determination.
This final notation was unnecessary, as the entire decision seemingly
foreshadows this obvious reliance on domestic sentencing practices.
One must question, however, the fate of Mr. Kambanda if he com-
mitted his acts within the territory of the Former Yugoslavia. This
manifest disparity encumbers justice on the international level.
In each of the cases conducted before the ICTY and ICTR thus far,
the convictions are based on crimes of systematic murder and exten-
sive torture of numerous individuals. In each instance, the crimes
esu's actions in accordance with acts defined in categories 1 and 2); Prosecutor v.
Serushago, ICTR 98-39-DP, _I.L.R._ (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 1999)
<http://wvw.ictr.org>. This institution of criminal categories after the genocide is
disconcerting since the use of such punishments may violate the principles nullum
crimen sine lege or nulla poena sine lege. Nonetheless, the ICTR has utilized the
Rwanda Organic Law categories in each of the three aforementioned decisions.
215. See Kambanda, ICTR-97-23-I, para. 19 (stating that persons in Category I
are subject to a mandatory death penalty, whereas, those convicted under Category
2 will receive the substitute penalty of life imprisonment). But see Schabas, supra
note 90, at 538 (indicating that even Category 1 defendants may benefit from
pleading guilty so long as their names were not included in the Official Gazette's
list of first category suspects).
216. See Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, para. 37 (suggesting that persons classified
under category 1 of the Rwanda Organic Law will not receive a reduced sentence
for a guilty plea).
217. See id. sec. IV (pleading guilty to genocide, conspiracy to commit geno-
cide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide,
murder, and extermination).
218. Id.
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were committed due to racial hatred or ethnic cleansing.219 In each of
these cases, the allegations were based on the most egregious trans-
gressions known to humankind-war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity. As one scholar explained, crimes against humanity are con-
sidered universally offensive and subject to international prosecution,
particularly because they are considered universal crimes-crimes
against all humankind. ° Why, then, is there such distinct variation
between the sentences rendered against international criminals? Why
is there not some measure of uniformity or universality in sentenc-
ing? The international community must solve this dilemma regarding
sentencing issues, and elucidate some standard principles before the
219. It is plausible that the distinctions in sentencing are based on the crimes
committed. While most of the defendants appearing before the ICTY are charged
with and convicted of crimes against humanity, each of the five ICTR defendants
have been charged with and convicted of genocide. See supra note 208 and ac-
companying text (classifying each defendant as either a category 1 or 2 defendant
but ultimately convicting each defendant of genocide). While, strictly speaking,
there is no hierarchy of human rights, there may be a sustainable argument for
treating genocide more harshly than crimes against humanity. While crimes against
humanity are unquestionably deplorable, the special intent required of genocide
may provide some justification for the noted disparity. It is more likely, however,
that the differentiation is tied to domestic models and is a direct result of the re-
spective Tribunals' reliance on the sentencing practices of domestic courts. See,
e.g., Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, paras. 14-16 (stating initially that "[t]he [Trial]
Chamber holds that crimes against humanity, already punished by the Nuremberg
and Tokyo Tribunals, and genocide, a concept defined later, are crimes which par-
ticularly shock the collective conscience," but later asserting that "the Chamber is
of the opinion that genocide constitutes the crime of crimes, which must be taken
into account when deciding the sentence."). To date, only one ICTY defendant
(Goran Jelisic) has even stood trial on charges of genocide and he was acquitted of
these charges. Instead, he was convicted on fifteen counts of crimes against hu-
manity and sixteen counts of violations of the laws and customs of war. See
<http://un.org/icty> (last visited Dec. 20, 1999).
220. See Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 52, at 2555-2557 (asserting
that crimes against humanity should be punished by an international court because
such crimes transcend municipal law and violators of offenses are an affront to all
mankind); see also Benjamin Ferencz, The United Nations and Human Rights
Forty Years Later, in NUREMBERG FORTY YEARS LATER: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
INJUSTICE IN OUR TIME 99, 102 (Irwin Cotler ed., 1995) ("When crimes reach such
a magnitude that they offend all of humankind, they are crimes not merely against
the state but against humanity. And every nation has a fight to intervene and insist
that those who are responsible, those who have committed these crimes and their
accomplices, be held accountable in a court of law.").
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ICC is given the onerous task of delivering justice to all human-
kind 221
B. DISTINCTIONS IN SENTENCING
Now, if you are to punish a man retributively, you must injure him. If you
are to reform him, you must improve him. And men are not improved by
their injuries.
It is problematic to compare the sentencing schemes at the two
Tribunals. Both Tribunals stem from an identical mandate to achieve
national reconciliation and the restoration of peace through criminal
prosecutions. Both Tribunals presumably are bound by Article 10(3)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
mandates that "[t]he penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of
prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and
social rehabilitation."m Yet, the proffered purposes for sentencing at
221. It seems both inconsistent and illogical to proclaim that a particular act
constitutes a crime against all humankind but render a sentence for each violation
depending on the venue where the crime was committed or, worse yet, the nation-
ality of the victim or offender. Such fallacious reasoning results in legitimate
claims of unfairness. The purpose of unifying or internationalizing a criminal jus-
tice system is to provide consistent approaches to dealing with the horrific nature
of war crimes and crimes against humanity, not only in the assurance of punish-
ment, but also in the sentences announced. Genocide should not result in a life
sentence for an offense committed in Rwanda and a 20-year term of imprisonment
for the same offense committed in Yugoslavia. See supra notes 215-218 and ac-
companying text. If the international community is to pay homage to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights' proclamation that "[a]ll human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights" and the further assurance that "[a]ll are equal be-
fore the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the
law," then a more uniform system of sentencing is necessary. Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948). The fact that certain countries may place a higher or lower sentenc-
ing value on life should not determine the gravity of the offense. Rather, as we
move toward a more global approach to criminal justice, we are in need of a more
consistent approach to criminal sentencing.
222. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE CRIME OF IMPRISONMENT" 26 (1946).
223. hIternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 6, at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316/Annex (1966). Article 10(3) suggests that the issuance of a life sentence
with no possibility of parole, pardon, or commutation constitutions improper pun-
ishment. See Schabas, supra note 195, at 509 (characterizing life imprisonment
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the ICTY and ICTR seem inconsistent and, at times, even irreconcil-
able. 4 If the world community attempts to prosecute war criminals
based on principles of universality and international customary law,
the resulting sentences should not be intertwined with domestic ju-
risprudence and should not find support in distinguishable theories of
punishment. As previously set forth, any attachment to domestic
practices delimits accountability based on the specific, and often
fortuitous, venue where the crime was committed. This approach
confirms the assertion that international law is not really law at all.
This type of international law remains dependent on and tied to the
nuances of each domestic jurisdiction. Such inequalities are unwork-
able if the international community is to establish a functioning body
of international criminal jurisprudence.
In many regards, the ICTY seems to fail humanity as it proclaims
minimal sentences for killers and torturers reminiscent of World War
II. To the extent that the Tribunal serves as a deterrent, the nature of
the penalties issued does not communicate the appropriate disgust or
intolerance necessary to dissuade another Drazan Erdemovic from
massacring another seventy to one hundred Muslims in a different
Balkan city. The level of hate still festering in the Former Yugoslavia
may encourage men and women to sacrifice five years22 of their re-
without the possibility of mitigation of the sentence as cruel, inhuman, and de-
grading punishment). The more restricted approach adopted by the Rome Statute,
whereby sentences generally are limited to 30 years, is reflective of the growing
consensus in Europe, which is that life sentences constitute improper punishment.
See id. at 480 (contending that Yugoslavian lawmakers perceived a sentence of life
imprisonment to be cruel punishment).
224. See id. at 476-81 (recognizing that a sentencing system tied solely to do-
mestic penal laws and lacking in any numeric or other traditional guidelines natu-
rally will lead to divergent sentencing approaches); see also Pickard, supra note
199, at 132 (observing that the rules and statutes of the Tribunals lack any numeri-
cal sentencing guidelines or provisions, despite efforts to define the crime within
the Tribunals' jurisdiction).
225. This statement assumes that Mr. Erdemovic actually will be required to
serve his full sentence. See ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 28 (providing for
early release of all convicted individuals). In fact, the language of Article 28 of the
ICTY Statute provides that "[i]f, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in
which the convicted person is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or com-
mutation of sentence, the State concerned shall notify the International Tribunal
accordingly." Id. Rule 123 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence seem-
ingly goes further in specifically requesting that the host State notify the Tribunal
of eligibility for pardon or commutation. See ICTY Rules, supra note 204 (setting
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spective lives to "settle a score." The message that the international
community, via the ICTY, is communicating to war criminals cannot
be overlooked. The lesson should be that no one is permitted to en-
gage in ethnic cleansing, rape, genocide, torture, murder, or any
other crime against humanity.2- 6 A sentence of five years does not
adequately deliver this mandate.1,
Yet, the other end of the spectrum causes equal concern. Recog-
nizing that international arrests and prosecutions are uniquely oner-
ous, the Tribunals should remain cognizant of the benefits received
from defendants who plead guilty. "' 8 The leniency denoted in Erde-
forth Rule 123, which requires a State housing an ICTY criminal to notify the Tri-
bunal of his pardon or early release). Because Mr. Erdemovic is incarcerated in
Norway, he is subject to an early release after either two-thirds of his sentence is
served or, after one-half of the sentence expires if he is a first time offender. See
Mary Margaret Penrose, Spandau Revisited: The Question of Detention and the
ICTY, at n.51 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Notre Dame's Center
for Civil and Human Rights).
226. This assurance regarding equal application of law is located in Article 7 of
both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. See ICTY Statute, supra note 61, at art. 7; see
also ICTR Statute, supra note 83, art. 7 (ensuring that anyone responsible for hu-
man rights violations is subject to criminal liability, irrespective of official position
in government). The relevant part of Article 7 ensures that "'[t]he official position
of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible
Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor
mitigate punishment." ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 7; see also ICTR Statute,
supra note 83, art. 7.
227. See Sharp, supra note 39, at 413 (asserting that light sentencing is indica-
tive of international apathy just as much as the international community's unwill-
ingness to search aggressively for and arrest indicted violators of human rights).
228. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgement, IT-96-22, para. 21,
__I.L.R.__ (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Yugo. 1998) <http://www.un.orgIicty> (reducing
Erdemovic's sentence on appeal, partly due to his cooperation with the Tribunal as
evinced by his surrender and subsequent guilty plea). The language regarding plea-
bargaining is quite insightful and bears repeating in full:
It is in the interests of international criminal justice and the purposes of the
International Tribunal to give appropriate weight to the cooperative attitude of
the accused. He truthfully confessed to his involvement in the massacre at a
time when no authority was seeking to prosecute him in connection therewith,
knoing that he would most probably face prosecution as a result. Under-
standing of the situation of those who surrender to the jurisdiction of the In-
ternational Tribunal and who confess their guilt is important for encouraging
other suspects or unknown perpetrators to come forward. The International
Tribunal, in addition to its mandate to investigate, prosecute and punish sei-
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movic's sentence certainly illustrates this point.229 The ICTY clearly
was responsive to the fact that an individual's plea of guilty saves ju-
dicial resources and insulates victims from reliving horrifying expe-
riences. The ICTR, however, did not demonstrate an adequate
awareness, or acceptance, of the realities of plea-bargaining in the
Jean Kambanda case. The ICTR noted that the defendant had "ex-
tended substantial co-operation and invaluable information to the
Prosecutor" and that "his guilty plea has also occasioned judicial
economy, saved victims the trauma and emotions of trial and en-
hanced the administration of justice."23
Despite this recognition, Jean Kambanda received the harshest
sentence available under the ICTR Statute-life imprisonment. In
fact, this sentence is identical to Mr. Kambanda's compatriots, Jean-
Paul Akayesu and Clement Kayishema, who demanded and received
a full trial. In advising clients, lawyers practicing before the ICTR
have less motivation to encourage defendants to plead guilty if there
is the possibility that the sentence will be the same as that received
following a trial.' This result is counterproductive to the furtherance
ous violations of international humanitarian law, has a duty, through its judi-
cial functions, to contribute to the settlement of the wider issues of account-
ability, reconciliation and establishing the truth behind the evils perpetrated in
the Former Yugoslavia. Discovering the truth is a cornerstone of the rule of
law and a fundamental step on the way to reconciliation: for it is the truth that
cleanses the ethnic and religious hatreds and begins the healing process. The
International Tribunal must demonstrate that those who have the honesty to
confess are treated fairly as part of a process underpinned by principles of
justice, fair trial and protection of the fundamental rights of the individual. On
the other hand, the International Tribunal is a vehicle through which the inter-
national community expresses its outrage at the atrocities committed in the
former Yugoslavia. Upholding values of international human rights means
that whilst protecting the rights of the accused, the International Tribunal
must not lose sight of the tragedy of the victims and the sufferings of their
families.
Id. (emphasis added).
229. See id. (reporting the leniency of Erdemovic's sentence, in spite of the fact
that he executed between 70 and 100 Muslims).
230. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Sentencing Judgment, ICTR-97-23-S, paras. 47,
54, I.L.R. (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 1998) <http://www.ictr.org>.
231. See supra note 213-15 and accompanying text (indicating that the crucial
variable may be whether the accused constitutes a Category 1 or Category 2 defen-
dant under Rwandan law).
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of human rights.212 If every defendant demanded a trial, the work of
the ICTR could lag on for years. At present, the paucity of prosecu-
tions and idleness of judgments undermines the original ICTR man-
date to restore peace to Rwanda. The recent sentence announced at
the ICTR against Omar Serushago, however, gives cause for hope.
For the first time in Arusha, an individual convicted by the Tribunal
received a sentence short of life.2"
Still distressing, in terms of sentencing, is the recognition that
these two Tribunals, provided with essentially identical mandates
and faced with similarly gruesome crimes," display markedly differ-
ent approaches toward sentencing. The ICTY and ICTR maintain a
shared prosecutor and a shared Appeals Chamber, yet the sentences
rendered by the separate bodies are worlds apart. While the ICTY
232. See Schabas, supra note 195, at 496-97 (noting the practice of plea-
bargaining in common law countries, where prosecutors frequently drop or reduce
some of the counts in exchange for a deal).
233. See Prosecutor v. Serushago, Sentencing Judgment, ICTR 98-39-S, para.
25, __I.L.R.__ (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 1999) <http://www.ictr.org> (demon-
strating one of the most encouraging opinions to come out of either Tribunal, be-
cause it truly merged the ICTY and ICTR Tribunals). Much like the ICTY's treat-
ment relating to Drazen Erdemovic, the Serushago judgment reflected a
recognition that plea-bargaining assists both the Tribunal, in terms of surrender and
judicial economy, and the individual countries still grappling with the issue of
healing and reconstruction. See Serushago, ICTR 98-39-S, para. 25. Accordingly,
the sentence levied against Mr. Serushago denotes the first variation of either Tri-
bunal from a strict adherence to domestic sentencing practices. If Mr. Sergushago
were convicted of genocide in Rwanda, he most certainly would have been subject
to the death penalty. See supra notes 211-218 and accompanying text (comparing
the different penalties for the same crime when the penalty depends on where the
crime was committed and which judicial body tries the case). His surrender and
subsequent prosecution by the ICTR unquestionably resulted in a more lenient
sentence of 15 years. See Serushago, ICTR 98-39-S, para. 25. And, since this con-
viction, the ICTR has issued a second "shortened" sentence of twenty-five years
against Obed Ruzindana. See generally <http://vw.ictr.org> (last visited Dec. 20,
1999).
234. While the acts of killing and torture similarly are grounded in racial hatred,
the true nature of the crimes is distinct. All three of the ICTR convictions included
counts of genocide, whereas the ICTY convictions fell short of genocide. Instead,
the majority of the convictions emanating from The Hague are grounded in crimes
against humanity and war crimes. Although there is no technical hierarchy of in-
ternational crimes, the desire to destroy an entire population, for example the Tut-
sis, rightfully provides a deeper cause for concern. Accordingly, while there is no
stated or express hierarchy, it appears that an informal belief that genocide is the
most grave crime is being reflected in both The Hague and Arusha.
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bases its sentencing practices on such considerations as its duties to
"contribut[e] to reconciliation," deterrence, and rehabilitation in the
Former Yugoslavia, the ICTR focuses instead on its "unfettered
discretion" to render justice by individualizing the sentence in each
case. 236 Only recently, and only once, have the separate Tribunals
demonstrated a shared desire to consider the personal circumstances
of the defendant by taking into consideration such issues as the de-
fendant's voluntary surrender versus arrest, a plea of guilty versus
trial, family and social background, and public expression of re-237
morse. While the ICTR potentially considered these variables in
each of its three decisions, the absence of language indicating these
considerations in the decisions preceding Prosecutor v. Serushago
belies such conclusion.
The failure to reach a consensus on the issue of sentencing will
preclude the ICC from simply adopting the Tribunals' collective
methodology. Rather than provide a single blueprint, the ICTY and
ICTR currently provide competing models. The inability to agree on
sentencing procedures merely impedes future tribunals and the ICC
from resting on the precedents being established. This failure most
likely will result in a situation analogous to the drawn out inception
of the two ad hoc Tribunals whereby, the first several years of the
235. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Sentencing Judgment, IT-95-17/1, paras.
287-91, I.L.R. (Int'l Crim. Trib. For Yugo. 1998) <http://www.un.org/icty>
(stating each of these as set forth by the ICTY in the "Sentencing Policy of the
Chamber"). The Trial Chamber actually made numerous statements-without de-
finitively arriving at a single list of "sentencing policies"-in explaining its sys-
tem. See Furundzjia, IT-95-17/1, para. 287-91 (noting initially that "[i]t is the
mandate and the duty of the International Tribunal, in contributing to reconcilia-
tion, to deter such crimes and to combat impunity."). Immediately thereafter, the
Tribunal stated that it "accepts that two important functions of the punishment are
retribution and deterrence." Id. (indicating later, however, that "none of the above
should be taken to detract from the Trial Chamber's support for rehabilitative pro-
grammes in which the accused may participate while serving his sentence.").
236. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Sentencing Judgment, ICTR-97-23-S, para.
25, _I.L.R. (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 1998) <http://www.ictr.org> (indi-
cating that although the Trial Chamber will look at Rwanda's general prison sen-
tencing practices, it will favor its own discretion to take into account the personal
circumstances of each individual defendant).
237. See, e.g., Serushago, ICTR 98-39-S (providing an illustration of the ICTR's
accounting for the individual circumstances of the case in determining the appro-
priate sentence).
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ICC's existence will be invested in evidentiary and procedural co-
nundrums. In addition, this failure calls into question the nature of
customary international law with respect to criminal sentencing. If no
such custom or practice exists, how can the world adopt a truly "in-
ternational" court? The time to change, or perhaps even merge, the
existing systems still exists, but that time is quickly running out.
IV. THE UNRESOLVED ISSUE OF DETENTION
[T]he paradox of punishment is that a penal institution somewhat similar
to that in use in our society seems from a moral point of view to be both
required and unjustified2 8
Neither Tribunal maintains a permanent prison facility. Rather,
both the ICTY and ICTR rely on the assistance of the international
community to effectuate and fulfill their respective mandates. Article
27 of the ICTY Statute provides that:
Imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the International
Tribunal from a list of States which have indicated to the Security Council
their willingness to accept convicted persons. Such imprisonment shall be
in accordance with the applicable law of the State concerned, subject to
the supervision of the International Tribunal. '
Article 27 is complemented by Rule 103 of the Tribunal's Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, which states that "[i]mprisonment shall be
served in a State designated by the Tribunal from a list of States
which have indicated their willingness to accept convicted per-
sons
. 240
These provisions invariably will lead to distinctions in treatment
between international prisoners depending on the host country ac-
cepting the prisoner. The ICTY Trial Chamber articulated concerns
of its own regarding detention and imprisonment issues in the first
sentencing case to come before the Tribunal, Prosecutor i. Erdeno-
238. Alan H. Goldman, The Paradox of Punishnent, in PUNISHMENT" 30, 30
(Simmons et al. eds., 1995).
239. ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 27 (emphasis added).
240. ICTY Rules, supra note 204.
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vic. The Tribunal noted that:
because persons found guilty will be obliged to serve their sentences in
institutions which are often far from their places of origin, the Trial
Chamber takes note of the inevitable isolation into which [such prisoners]
will have been placed. Moreover, cultural and linguistic differences will
distinguish them from the other detainees.
24
'
These factors-transportation, lack of language ability, and remote-
ness from family members-cause concern from a human rights per-
spective. Transportation, in and of itself, can be seen as punitive.
4 1
To date, however, the debate regarding enforcement of sentences
has focused less on the practical details relating to conditions of con-
finement and more on the immediate problem relating to simply se-
curing agreements from States to accept prisoners. Both the ICTY
and ICTR lobbied for State assistance with enforcing sentences to no
avail.2 43 The Honorable Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, ICTY President,
recently called for support from the international community while
delivering a speech at American University in Washington, D.C.
244
241. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, IT-96-22-T, _I.L.R._
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Yugo. 1996) <http://www.un.org/icty>, vacated on other
grounds.
242. See Schabas, supra note 195, at 494 (providing the archetypal example of
the Australian Prison Colony). Professor Schabas recommends that, to properly
determine the appropriate sentence, a tribunal should consider the place and condi-
tion of incarceration as mitigating factors. See id. at 494-95 (acknowledging that
Tribunal prisoners placed in facilities in countries different from their own are
isolated in that their families are not nearby for visits, they likely do not speak the
language, and their cultures likely are different, thereby making socialization with
other prisoners or prison personnel difficult).
243. See Fourth Annual Report, supra note 126; Third Annual Report of the
ICTR (last modified Sept. 23, 1998) <http://www.un.org> [hereinafter Third An-
nual Report of the ICTR]. The Secretary-General sent a letter to all member states
regarding enforcement and inviting each state to acknowledge whether they were
capable of assisting the ICTR in the enforcement of sentences. Only six states re-
sponded to this communication. See Third Annual Report of the ICTR, para. 156.
Norway and Sweden indicated their willingness to assist with enforcement,
whereas Ecuador, Estonia, Japan, and Liechtenstein each responded that they were
unable to provide help. See id. Previously, Belgium, Denmark, and Switzerland
each indicated their willingness to receive ICTR prisoners. See id. para. 154. Not a
single state responding favorably, however, has signed a formal agreement ena-
bling the transport of ICTR prisoners to these states. See id.
244. Judge McDonald joined many other notable international scholars and ju-
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Judge McDonald explained that "the nature of the modem State and
its place in the international community means that it is they [the in-
dividual states] who are expected, in fact required, to provide the
structural and systematic support necessary to sustain the Tribu-
nal."245 This expectation includes the agreement from host states to
provide prison space for international criminals.'
Much like the dilemma encountered with arrests, the international
community is not offering assistance with detention. Beyond the ob-
vious concerns regarding prison space, an additional concern arises
when one ponders the future of the Tribunals. Both bodies are pre-
sumptively temporary structures. Yet, provisions do not exist that
oversee the enforcement of sentences being pronounced once the
Tribunals are disbanded.
Issues relating to pardon, commutation, and parole are to be di-
rected to the Tribunal President, who in consultation with the judges,
is to render a decision.247 This provision presupposes that these bod-
ies-or some relic of these bodies-will be in existence at the time
such pardon, commutation, and/or parole decisions become neces-
sary. Depending on the host-state and domestic parole regulations,
the length of incarceration will vary. ' Prisoners receiving life sen-
tences surely will outlive the existence of these Tribunals.2" Never-
fists at a conference entitled War Crines Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects,
which took place at American University's Washington College of Law from
March 31-April 1, 1998.
245. The Honorable Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Conference on War Crimes Tri-
bunals: The International Crininal Tribunal for the Forner Yugoslavia, 13 A%.
U. INT'L L. REV. 1422, 1426 (1998).
246. See id. (advocating the need for states to provide space in their prisons for
international convicts).
247. See ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 28; see also ICTR Statute, supra note
83, art. 29 (discussing the judicial process regarding parole and commutation of
sentences within each Tribunal).
248. See Mary Margaret Penrose, Spandau Revisited: The Question of Detention
and the ICTY (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Notre Dame's Center
for Civil and Human Rights) (discussing the parole provisions in Norway, Italy,
and Finland).
249. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 615-18 (describing a similar situation
that the International Military Tribunal faced when it abandoned the Tribunal in
Germany). Rudolf Hess was the last defendant remaining in 1987 when he com-
mitted suicide at the Spandau prison facility. See id. (noting that Spandau was the
38
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theless, no formal consideration has been given to this issue.
In many respects, sentencing is one of the most overlooked com-
ponents of the Tribunals' work. While the international community is
clamoring for arrests, indictments, and convictions, little mention is
made of the sentencing and detention dilemma facing the ICTY and
ICTR. No structured response has been provided regarding the in-
evitable issues of pardon, parole, and commutation. It is as though
convictions in name will suffice, with little energy being invested in
the actual mechanics of criminal sentencing.
Still, the international community speaks eagerly of an ICC and
the unprecedented influence such body will have on world order. As
we race forward to build yet another international criminal institu-
tion, perhaps it is prudent to consider precisely where and how we
will house these international criminals. To date, there are but six
choices. Could it be that the vision of effective criminal prosecutions
was so distant that the actual need for prison facilities was something
of an afterthought for the Tribunal architects? To have a functioning
international criminal court, there must be a prison facilityS or clus-
ter of facilities25" ' to place individuals once convicted. That simple
solution, however, remains elusive. It is one more area in which the
international community is failing.
V. FUTURE OUTLOOK
I believe that even amid today's mortar bursts and whining bullets, there
is still hope for a brighter tomorrow. I believe that wounded justice, lying
sole place of detention for the Nuremberg defendants). Similarly, the Tokyo de-
fendants all served their respective sentences contemporaneously at the Sugamo
Prison facility in Tokyo. See MINEAR, supra note 67, at 174 (reporting that, be-
cause the sentences rendered outlasted the presence of the Far East Tribunal, the
Japanese government eventually was given limited authority over the Tokyo pris-
oners).
250. See Nancy E. Guffey-Landers, Establishing an International Criminal
Court: Will It Do Justice?, 20 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 199, 233 (1996) (advo-
cating a need for a prison facility specifically for international criminals).
251. An international or regional group of prison facilities might be an adequate
solution. Since each of the major geographic and political areas, with the exception
of Asia, maintain regional judicial systems, perhaps adopting regional prison sys-
tems provides the best possible starting place.
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prostrate on the blood-flowing streets of our nations, can be lifted from
this dust of shame to reign supreme among the children of men..1.
It is easy at this juncture to admit or forecast failure. The two Tri-
bunals truly have added little to the peace and world order of our in-
ternational community. Indictees remain free and flaunt, with great
indignation, the inability of international law to reach them. There is
no police or military force, to date, which has ensured that the man-
date of either Tribunal is fulfilled. As the few individual defendants
who have received a trial or pleaded guilty begin to receive their
sentences, a mere six states have indicated their willingness to coop-
erate in enforcing these sentences. Intellectual honesty demands that,
at some point, there is a candid assessment of the approximately 400
million-dollar 3 investment required to adjudicate these sparse con-
victions. For the thousands of refugees who fled Kosovo, and the
equally offensive number of Rwandans who remain perishing in
overcrowded domestic prisons, the self-righteous veneer must be
lifted to expose this futile investment."' It is important to ask how
much this money could have contributed to the well being and po-
tential security for those displaced by the two conflicts. International
criminal law, as exemplified by the two ad hoc Tribunals, has proven
itself lamentably deliberate and incapable of single-handedly restor-
252. Martin Luther King, Jr., 1964 Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, in I HAVE A
DREAM. 110 (James M. Washington ed., 1992).
253. See Third Annual Report of the ICTR, supra note 243 (showing a gross
budget for the Tribunal in 1997 of $41,517,450). This same document indicates
that the ICTR budget increased in 1998 to S56,736,300. See id. (indicating the
$15,000,000 increase over only one year); cf ICTY Bulletin No. 18 (visited Aug.
23, 1999) <http://www.un.org/icty> (reporting the ICTY budget for 1997 as
S48,587,000). But see MERON, supra note 150, at 283 (contending that although
the Tribunal has not yet accomplished its goals specific to Yugoslavia, it has rein-
forced international law, which is a feat that should be noted in a cost-benefit
analysis).
254. There is no question that the "moral high-ground" continues to be occupied
by those supporting the Tribunals. Yet, from a sheer economic perspective, one
must challenge the approach taken to discern whether the best choice was made.
While hindsight provides a great advantage over those acting in the moment, peri-
odic reviews are necessary to ensure that advancement is made in the most effec-
tive manner, which is by utilizing knowledge obtained over the years. If history
truly does repeat itself, there is an obligation to avoid those mistakes that we are
capable of avoiding.
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ing peace or justice to either region. The international community is
again failing.
Unlike its predecessor institutions, the ICC possesses an important
advantage-there is no sense of urgency. The ICC has been a vision
of the international community since the time immediately following
World War 11.255 Only with the resurgence of genocide and the reap-
pearance of ad hoc criminal bodies has the vision transformed into a
workable model capable of realization. Yet, much like its predeces-
sors, the impetus of the ICC is the continued existence of war crimes
and crimes against humanity, such as ethnic cleansing and genocide.
The importance of non-immediacy should not be discounted. The
ICC has a luxury that both modern Tribunals were denied-the lux-
ury of time. Accordingly, the builders of this long-awaited institution
should utilize this luxury to the fullest extent and take the requisite
time before its inception to ponder the future implications of interna-
tionalizing criminal law. As previously indicated, the issues of ar-
rests, sentencing, and detention should receive particular considera-
tion. The ICC must realize, and remain fully cognizant, of the
failures and shortcomings experienced at Nuremberg, Tokyo, and
more recently, in The Hague and Arusha. The ICC, as presently
structured, has the continuing disadvantage of being a court in an in-
ternational system with no police force, no prison system, and no
true mechanism for coercing recalcitrant states to comply with its or-
ders.256 As the two modern ad hoc bodies have demonstrated, these
omissions and inadequacies pose much more serious problems than
initially envisioned. The failure to remedy the lack of enforcement
powers, sentencing disparities, and detention issues likely will lead
to a replication of the impotency experienced at the ICTY and
ICTR.2
57
An international criminal court is a good start toward achieving
255. See SCHARF, supra note 5, at 14 (commenting that the development of an
international criminal court has been an objective since the Nuremberg trials).
256. Under the current system, it is doubtful whether the ICC could require any
state to submit to its jurisdiction. The United States indicated its reluctance to sign
on to a world court such as the ICC, thereby sacrificing some of its sacrosanct sov-
ereignty.
257. See Pejic, supra note 148, at 860 (urging for enforcement in international
criminal law).
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international accountability for the gravest and most vile crimes, but
one must not be shortsighted or overly eager to build a structure
without substance. What good has come to the Former Yugoslavia
by indicting many low-level individuals while permitting President
Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, and Ratko Mladic to remain
free? Their continued presence within Yugoslavia likely contributed
to the purging of Kosovar Albanians during the spring of 1999. Their
continued freedom insults those awaiting justice. Likewise, the ICTR
has made little progress by convicting five individuals and having
only two venues to send these individuals for service of their sen-
tences. The international community must stand up and begin con-
tributing to what was anticipated as a truly international endeavor.
For now, state cooperation remains conspicuously absent.
Yet, the international community should not accept this negative
assessment as conclusive evidence that it is bound to fail again in the
future. Rather, the world should be motivated to make change-a
change that is well-reasoned, well-considered, and that evinces an
ability to learn from past mistakes. That change is possible. While
the international community may not yet possess a solution for war
and conflict, it certainly has the ability to enforce the laws of war.
Politics must be placed far behind the more immediate need for
world order. Law must come first and enforcement of law is a pre-
requisite to respect for the law. International law without enforce-
ment will fail. It has failed. -8 It continues to fail. ' 59
258. See FERENCZ, supra note 47, at xix (maintaining that, although there has
been progress in international law, there has been a great deal of failure, which
leaves the world in a dangerous place and averring that significant further progress
must be made to achieve effective enforcement of international criminal law).
259. See CONOT, supra note 188, at 520 (setting forth poignant comments re-
garding the state of international criminal law at the conclusion of Nuremberg and
inspiring the United States and the world to start making progress in the area). Mr.
Conot writes:
"What, basically, did Nuremberg accomplish?" Francis Biddle asked in a re-
port to President Truman upon his return to the United States. The conclu-
sions of Nuremberg may be ephemeral or they may be significant. That de-
pends on whether we now take the next step. I suggest that the time has now
come to set about draffing a code of international criminal law. At first, it
seemed as if the United Nations might act on Biddle's proposal. On Decem-
ber 11, 1946, the General Assembly affirmed without dissent the judgment of
the tribunal, and decided to embody the principles in "a general codification
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Whatever solution is selected, the criticisms proffered in this Arti-
cle constitute a sincere attempt to better the system that exists. The
world is on the brink not only of failure, but also of success. The
Rome Statute and nascent ICC provide a long awaited opportunity.
The rule of law finally may have a place among the sovereign nature
of independent states. 2' There is possibly, after more than fifty years
of preparation, a common understanding regarding world order. As
Henry David Thoreau once said:
If one advances confidently in the direction of his dreams, and endeavors
to live the life which he has imagined, he will meet with a success unex-
pected in common hours .... If you have built castles in the air, your
work need not be lost; that is where they should be. Now put foundations
under them.26
The ICTY and ICTR provide a formula capable of much im-
provement. Now put foundations under them.
of offenses against the peace and security of mankind, or of an international
criminal code." Once more, predictably, it was far easier to agree in principle
than to implement the principles with a machinery of enforcement.
Id.
260. The recent arrest and continued detention of former Chilean President
Augusto Pinochet exemplifies the debate between international law and state sov-
ereignty. Numerous Chileans protested the arrest of General Pinochet in England
despite sustainable claims that he violated numerous principles of international
law.
261. See generally Cassese, supra note 119, at 4 (making a similar analogy al-
though cast in more negative terms). In describing the questionable foundation of
the Tribunals, Judge Cassese referenced a German lawyer's comments from 1932
as follows:
[I]ntemational law is an edifice built on a volcano-state sovereignty. By this,
[Niemeyer] meant that whenever state sovereignty explodes onto the interna-
tional scene, it may demolish the very bricks and mortar from which the Law
of Nations is built. It is for this reason that international law aims to build de-
vices to withstand the seismic activity of states: to prevent or diminish their
pernicious effect. This metaphor is particularly apt in relation to an interna-
tional tribunal. The tribunal must always contend with the violent eruptions of
state sovereignty: the effect of states' lack of cooperation is like lava burning
away the foundations of the institution.
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